两周之前，乔姆斯基访华到北京大学演讲，曾引起了不小的轰动。各路媒体给乔姆斯基扣上了一顶顶大帽子，「可能是还健在的最重要的知识分子」、「语言学界的爱因斯坦」、「当代认知科学之父」、「20世纪全球十位最伟大科学家之一」等等，不一而足。北大的宣传中甚至还称其是「继上个世纪初期罗素与杜威之后，来华访问的最重要的西方哲人」。虽然这些「头衔」有些实在有点过火，但不可否认的是，乔姆斯基在当今语言学界、心理学界、哲学界及政治学界都有着极大的影响力。
关于这次演讲，我就不多说什么了，网上既有相关视频，也有亲历者的详细介绍。
不过提到乔姆斯基，不得不提的是他好辩的风格。几十年间，与其辩论过的各界人士无数，其中就有Jean Piaget（瑞士心理学家，发生认识论的提出者）、Samuel Huntington（美国政治学家，文明冲突论的提出者）、William Buckley（美国保守主义先锋）、Hilary Putnam（美国哲学家，实用主义代表人物）等。而其中最知名的，无疑是1971年他与福柯在荷兰电视台的一场电视辩论。目前网上还能找到一小段视频：
辩论分为两部分，前半部分侧重于哲学，后半部分则侧重于政治。不过整场辩论都是围绕「人性」这一概念而展开的。乔姆斯基从他最熟悉的人类语言能力的创造性角度出发，认为人性的存在是不可否认的。而福柯则对人性持怀疑态度，他从科学史与认识史的角度谈起，避开人性、个体创造力等概念，企图从理解的转换的角度来看待认识史。在谈到政治议题时，两人虽都对当时的政治体系持批判态度，但他们间的分歧也相当明显。乔姆斯基顺着之前的思路，在承认人性的基础上，认为强权是对人性的压抑、强权是必须被推翻的，便这样很自然地过渡到了他的无政府工团主义的政治信仰上来，认为只有这样才能最大限度地释放人性。但对福柯来说，他对乔姆斯基提到的以公正的名义来反对强权的说法不以为然，在福柯眼中，「公正」只是一种人们有来巩固权力或反对权力的工具罢了，他认为公正、人性等都只是产生于我们阶级体制的概念。
下面是这场辩论的全文。英文版出自乔姆斯基个人的官方网站（由于福柯在辩论中说的是法文，因而其中的英文并不是福柯说的原文），中文则来自杜小真编的《福柯集》一书，由丛莉翻译。不过这中文的也只是供参考吧，翻译的错误不少，需要与原文对照读才不会理解出错。
Human Nature: Justice versus Power 论人性：公正与权力的对立
ELDERS: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the third debate of the International Philosophers' Project. Tonight's debaters are Mr. Michel Foucault, of the College de France, and Mr. Noam Chomsky, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Both philosophers have points in common and points of difference. Perhaps the best way to compare both philosophers would be to see them as tunnellers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other's direction.
埃勒德：女士们、先生们，欢迎各位光临国际哲学规划大会的第三场讨论会。今晚参加讨论的有法兰西学院的米歇尔·福柯先生和麻省理工学院的诺昂·乔姆斯基先生。这两位哲学家的观点既有相同之处也有分歧。或许我们可以把这种情况比做两位开凿山洞的工人，他们手持不同的工具相向工作，并不清楚是否能在洞中相逢。
But both are doing their jobs with quite new ideas, digging as profoundly as possible with an equal commitment in philosophy as in politics: enough reasons, it seems to me for us to expect a fascinating debate about philosophy and about politics.
两位学者以全新的思想指导自己的工作，在哲学和政治领域里力求开凿得尽可能地远。因此我们深信今晚的讨论会一定会引人入胜。
I intend, therefore, not to lose any time and to start off with a central, perennial question: the question of human nature.
闲言少叙。我用一个永恒的、基本的问题开场，即人性问题。
All studies of man, from history to linguistics and psychology, are faced with the question of whether, in the last instance, we are the product of all kinds of external factors, or if, in spite of our differences, we have something we could call a common human nature, by which we can recognise each other as human beings.
所有关于人的研究，从历史到语言学、到心理学，都应解决下面这个问题：我们是由各种外部因素构成的产物还是拥有一个共同的特性？由于此特性，我们才被视为人类。
So my first question is to you Mr. Chomsky, because you often employ the concept of human nature, in which connection you even use terms like "innate ideas" and "innate structures". Which arguments can you derive from linguistics to give such a central position to this concept of human nature?
这个问题是向您，乔姆斯基先生提出来的。因为您经常使用人性这个概念，使用「天赋观念」、「天赋结构」等词语。为了赋予人性概念以中心地位您从语言学中获得了哪些论据？
CHOMSKY: Well, let me begin in a slightly technical way.
乔姆斯基：我先从略带些技术性的方面来回答。
A person who is interested in studying languages is faced with a very definite empirical problem. He's faced with an organism, a mature, let's say adult, speaker, who has somehow acquired an amazing range of abilities, which enable him in particular to say what he means, to understand what people say to him, to do this in a fashion that I think is proper to call highly creative ... that is, much of what a person says in his normal intercourse with others is novel, much of what you hear is new, it doesn't bear any close resemblance to anything in your experience; it's not random novel behaviour, clearly, it's behaviour which is in some sense which is very hard to characterise, appropriate to situations. And in fact it has many of the characteristics of what I think might very well be called creativity.
一个对语言学研究感兴趣的人会面对一个特别典型的经验论问题。他发现在他面前有一个有机体，即一个成年对话者。由于获得了非凡的能力使得他能够阐明自己的思想、理解别人的话语，并且以一种我认为具有高度创造性的方式做出了这一切……因为一个人在谈话中所说的大部分东西是新的，而我们所听到的大部分东西也是新的，只有极少一部分同我们的经历相类似。这种行为决非偶然，它以一种难以描绘的方式适应环境。事实上，它同被称之为创造性的东西有许多相同点。
Now, the person who has acquired this intricate and highly articulated and organised collection of abilities-the collection of abilities that we call knowing a language-has been exposed to a certain experience; he has been presented in the course of his lifetime with a certain amount of data, of direct experience with a language.
能够驾驶这种复杂的、极清晰和有条理的整体，并具有我们称之为语言知识的人，便具有了一定的经验。在他的人生历程中，他曾置身于某些材料之中，有着语言的直接感受。
We can investigate the data that's available to this person; having done so, in principle, we're faced with a reasonably clear and well-delineated scientific problem, namely that of accounting for the gap between the really quite small quantity of data, small and rather degenerate in quality, that's presented to the child, and the very highly articulated, highly systematic, profoundly organised resulting knowledge that he somehow derives from these data.
如果我们观察一下他最后拥有的基本概念，我们就会面对一个十分确切的科学问题：如何解释横在孩子获得的质差量少的材料与以某种方式从基本概念中派生出来的、经过深层组织的、有系统的知识之间的距离呢？
Furthermore we notice that varying individuals with very varied experience in a particular language nevertheless arrive at systems which are very much congruent to one another. The systems that two speakers of English arrive at on the basis of their very different experiences are congruent in the sense that, over an overwhelming range, what one of them says, the other can understand.
进一步说，操着某种语言的、经历各异的不同个体最终仍会达到相互极为和谐的系统。两个英语对话者从各自不同的经历出发会达互和谐的系统，从广义来说就是一个刚说出话来，另一个便马上会理解。
Furthermore, even more remarkable, we notice that in a wide range of languages, in fact all that have been studied seriously, there are remarkable limitations on the kind of systems that emerge from the very different kinds of experiences to which people are exposed.
而更令人注意的是，人们发现从语言的广度来看，就是进行过认真研究的所有范围来看，出自人们亲身经历的系统服从于一些明确的限制。
There is only one possible explanation, which I have to give in a rather schematic fashion, for this remarkable phenomenon, namely the assumption that the individual himself contributes a good deal, an overwhelming part in fact, of the general schematic structure and perhaps even of the specific content of the knowledge that he ultimately derives from this very scattered and limited experience.
对这个令人瞩目的现象，只存在一种可能的解释。我简略地谈一下。根据假设，一个人把大部分精力投于到整体结构的转换上，也许还投入到知识的特殊内容上，这是从他零散的、有限的经历中最后得到的。
A person who knows a language has acquired that knowledge because he approached the learning experience with a very explicit and detailed schematism that tells him what kind of language it is that he is being exposed to. That is, to put it rather loosely: the child must begin with the knowledge, certainly not with the knowledge that he's hearing English or Dutch or French or something else, but he does start with the knowledge that he's hearing a human language of a very narrow and explicit type, that permits a very small range of variation. And it is because he begins with that highly organised and very restrictive schematism, that he is able to make the huge leap from scattered and degenerate data to highly organised knowledge. And furthermore I should add that we can go a certain distance, I think a rather long distance, towards presenting the properties of this system of knowledge, that I would call innate language or instinctive knowledge, that the child brings to language learning; and also we can go a long way towards describing the system that is mentally represented when he has acquired this knowledge.
掌握一种语言的人通过学习明晰、具体的模式便拥有了这种学问，它起着某种类似于法典的作用（「法典的作用」的表述有些含糊）。或者，用不那么准确的话说：孩子学习语言并不是从模仿听到的英语、法语或荷兰语起步的，而是从明白这是一种明确的、须臾不可离的人类语言开始的。这是因为他从一个既有条理又有约束的模式出发，因而有能力通过散乱、贫乏的材料达到高度条理化的知识。再补充一点，在知识体系的特性方面（我称之为天赋语言或本能知识，它是孩子学习语言时具有的能力），我们能够走得更远。
I would claim then that this instinctive knowledge, if you like, this schematism that makes it possible to derive complex and intricate knowledge on the basis of very partial data, is one fundamental constituent of human nature. In this case I think a fundamental constituent because of the role that language plays, not merely in communication, but also in expression of thought and interaction between persons; and I assume that in other domains of human intelligence, in other domains of human cognition and behaviour, something of the same sort must be true.
我认为，这种本能的知识，或更确切地说，这种依据很不完全的材料获得复杂知识的模式，是人性的基本构成部分。说它是基本构成部分是因为语言不仅在交际中起作用，在思想表达和个体之间的相互影响中都起作用。我设想在智慧、知识和人类行为等其他领域也有相同的事情。
Well, this collection, this mass of schematisms, innate organising principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behaviour, that's what I mean to refer to by the concept of human nature.
这个模式整体，这些天赋组织原则，指导着我们的社会行为、智力行为和个人行为。这就是当我涉及人性概念时要特别指出的。
ELDERS: Well, Mr. Foucault, when I think of your books like The History of Madness and Words and Objects, I get the impression that you are working on a completely different level and with a totally opposite aim and goal; when I think of the word schematism in relation to human nature, I suppose you are trying to elaborate several periods with several schematisms. What do you say to this?
埃勒德：那么，福柯先生，我想起您的《疯狂史》或《词与物》。我的感觉是您研究的层次与乔姆斯基先生不同，您的目标也与之完全对立。我想，您试图按阶段为这个同人性有关联的模式论增添色彩。对此您想说什么呢？
FOUCAULT: Well, if you don't mind I will answer in French, because my English is so poor that I would be ashamed of answering in English.
福柯：如果你们不厌烦的话，我要用法语回答问题。因为我的英语很差，羞于使用它。
It is true that I mistrust the notion of human nature a little, and for the following reason: I believe that of the concepts or notions which a science can use, not all have the same degree of elaboration, and that in general they have neither the same function nor the same type of possible use in scientific discourse. Let's take the example of biology. You will find concepts with a classifying function, concepts with a differentiating function, and concepts with an analytical function: some of them enable us to characterise objects, for example that of "tissue"; others to isolate elements, like that of "hereditary feature"; others to fix relations, such as that of "reflex". There are at the same time elements which play a role in the discourse and in the internal rules of the reasoning practice. But there also exist "peripheral" notions, those by which scientific practice designates itself, differentiates itself in relation to other practices, delimits its domain of objects, and designates what it considers to be the totality of its future tasks. The notion of life played this role to some extent in biology during a certain period.
的确，我有些怀疑人性这个观念，原因如下：我认为一门学科能够使用的概念或观念并不具有同一设计标准。一般来说，在科学讨论中，它们既没有相同的功能，也不属同一可使用类型。以生物学为例，某些概念具有分类学功能，而另一些则有分化或分析功能；有些可以从组织角度使我们确定对象，而另一些如遗传性则分离各个元素，还有一些起反射作用。同时，有些因素在讨论中以及在推理实验的内在规律里都起作用。但同时还存在着边缘观念，科学实践正是通过边缘观念得以确认、得以区别于其他类型的实践、得以界定自己的领域及规划出未来的总体任务。在既定的时期内，生命观念在生物学中便起着这种作用。
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the notion of life was hardly used in studying nature: one classified natural beings, whether living or non-living, in a vast hierarchical tableau which went from minerals to man; the break between the minerals and the plants or animals was relatively undecided; epistemologically it was only important to fix their positions once and for all in an indisputable way.
17、18世纪时，生命观念在自然科学研究中几乎不被使用。在从矿物到人的庞大分类表中，人们只列出了有生命的自然物和非生命自然物体。那时矿物同植物或动物的区分相对来说是含糊的。从知识论的角度看，应当为它们一锤定音，唯一要注意的是以无可争议的方式做这件事。
At the end of the eighteenth century, the description and analysis of these natural beings showed, through the use of more highly perfected instruments and the latest techniques, an entire domain of objects, an entire field of relations and processes which have enabled us to define the specificity of biology in the knowledge of nature. Can one say that research into life has finally constituted itself in biological science? Has the concept of life been responsible for the organisation of biological knowledge? I don't think so. It seems to me more likely that the transformations of biological knowledge at the end of the eighteenth century, were demonstrated on one hand by a whole series of new concepts for use in scientific discourse and on the other hand gave rise to a notion like that of life which has enabled us to designate, to delimit and to situate a certain type of scientific discourse, among other things. I would say that the notion of life is not a scientific concept; it has been an epistemological indicator of which the classifying, delimiting and other functions had an effect on scientific discussions, and not on what they were talking about:
18世纪末，由于先进的工具和新技术的出现，对这些自然存在物的描写及分析展示出一个完整的课题领域，一个在对自然的认识中使我们能够确定生物学特征的程序和关系范围。能肯定地说对生命的研究最终构成了生物学吗？生命概念是生物学知识结构的成因吗？我不这么想。很有可能在18世纪末出现了生物知识的转化。这归功于出现了一系列科学词汇构成的新概念，而它们又导致像生命这类观念的诞生，这使我们能够在其他事物中指明、界定和置放这类词汇。依我看，生命观念不是一个科学概念，而是一个起分类、区别作用的知识指示器，它的功能作用于科学词汇而非客体。
Well, it seems to me that the notion of human nature is of the same type. It was not by studying human nature that linguists discovered the laws of consonant mutation, or Freud the principles of the analysis of dreams, or cultural anthropologists the structure of myths. In the history of knowledge, the notion of human nature seems to me mainly to have played the role of an epistemological indicator to designate certain types of discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or history. I would find it difficult to see in this a scientific concept.
我觉得人性观念也属这一类型。语言学家并不是在研究人性时发现了协韵规律，弗洛伊德的梦幻分析原则、文化人类学的神话结构也都如此。在认识史中，我感觉似乎人性观念主要起了知识指示器的作用，同时用以指明某些类型的词汇与神学、生物学或史学有关联或与之相对立，很难认为它是一个科学概念。
CHOMSKY: Well, in the first place, if we were able to specify in terms of, let's say, neural networks the properties of human cognitive structure that make it possible for the child to acquire these complicated systems, then I at least would have no hesitation in describing those properties as being a constituent element of human nature. That is, there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is that we do with our mental capacities in this case.
乔姆斯基：那么，首先，如果我们能用神经元网术语详细说明人类认知结构的属性，它使儿童获得复杂系统，我便毫不犹豫地认同这些属性是人性的构成部分。世上存在一种无变化的生物元素，在此情况下这是我们的官能赖以运作的基础。
But I would like to pursue a little further the line of development that you outlined, with which in fact I entirely agree, about the concept of life as an organising concept in the biological sciences.
我想进一步追述您的思想发展。生命概念在生物学科里是一个组织概念，对此我完全赞同。
It seems to me that one might speculate a bit further speculate in this case, since we're talking about the future, not the past-and ask whether the concept of human nature or of innate organising mechanisms or of intrinsic mental schematism or whatever we want to call it, I don't see much difference between them, but let's call it human nature for shorthand, might not provide for biology the next peak to try to scale, after having-at least in the minds of the biologists, though one might perhaps question this-already answered to the satisfaction of some the question of what is life.
我觉得我看不出人性概念、组织的天赋机理概念或者内在精神模式概念之间的差别，我指的是将来而非过去。简言之就定为人性吧。在以某些人满意的方式为生命下了定义后，它也不可能构成生物学的未来阶段。至少在一些生物学家看来，这一点还远未使人信服。
In other words, to be precise, is it possible to give a biological explanation or a physical explanation...is it possible to characterise, in terms of the physical concepts presently available to us, the ability of the child to acquire complex systems of knowledge; and furthermore, critically, having acquired such systems of knowledge, to make use of this knowledge in the free and creative and remarkably varied ways in which he does?
为了更准确些，换个词汇，难道不能用生物学或物理学方面的解释？难道不能根据我们所掌握的物理概念来描绘儿童获取知识的复杂系统能力的特点？描绘儿童今后用一种自由的、创造性的、多要的方式运用这种知识的能力？
Can we explain in biological terms, ultimately in physical terms, these properties of both acquiring knowledge in the first place and making use of it in the second? I really see no reason to believe that we can; that is, it's an article of faith on the part of scientists that since science has explained many other things it will also explain this.
能否用生物学词汇，最终用物理学词汇来解释获取知识和运用知识的能力？我找不出理由认为我们可以做到这一点。这涉及到科学家追求的信念问题：既然科学已经解释了若干事物，它将同样能够解决这个问题。
In a sense one might say that this is a variant of the body/mind problem. But if we look back at the way in which science has scaled various peaks, and at the way in which the concept of life was finally acquired by science after having been beyond its vision for a long period, then I think we notice at many points in history-and in fact the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are particularly clear examples-that scientific advances were possible precisely because the domain of physical science was itself enlarged. Classic cases are Newton's gravitational forces. To the Cartesians, action at a distance was a mystical concept, and in fact to Newton himself it was an occult quality, a mystical entity, which didn't belong within science. To the common sense of a later generation, action at a distance has been incorporated within science.
从某种意义上来自，可以说这涉及人体－精神问题的变种。如果回想一下科学跨越各个阶段的方法和它最终获得生命概念（这个概念曾长斯被忽视）的方法，我们便会注意到在历史的众多阶段科学的进步十分明显。17、18世纪尤为突出，物理学领域此时大为扩展，牛顿万有引力的威力是典型事例。笛卡尔主义者认为远距离作用是神秘概念，而在牛顿看来这是具有玄奥性、是不属于科学的神秘实体。对于后来的科学家，远距离作用理所当然属于科学范畴。
What happened was that the notion of body, the notion of the physical had changed. To a Cartesian, a strict Cartesian, if such a person appeared today, it would appear that there is no explanation for the behaviour of the heavenly bodies. Certainly there is no explanation for the phenomena that are explained in terms of electro-magnetic force, let's say. But by the extension of physical science to incorporate hitherto unavailable concepts, entirely new ideas, it became possible to successively build more and more complicated structures that incorporated a larger range of phenomena.
认为人体观念是物理学范畴的时代已经过去了。对于标准的笛卡尔主义者来说——如果今日还存在这样一位人士的话——天堂里人体的行为是不可解释的。他肯定对用电磁力词汇阐述一些奇异现象也无能为力。多亏物理科学的发展，它吸收了一些被排斥在外的概念、全新的思想，成为可以创立越来越复杂的结构、包含越来越多的现象的学科。
For example, it's certainly not true that the physics of the Cartesians is able to explain, let's say, the behaviour of elementary particles in physics, just as it's unable to explain the concepts of life.
例如，笛卡尔主义者的物理学肯定不能解释基本粒子的活动，也不能解释生命概念。
Similarly, I think, one might ask the question whether physical science as known today, including biology, incorporates within itself the principles and the concepts that will enable it to give an account of innate human intellectual capacities and, even more profoundly, of the ability to make use of those capacities under conditions of freedom in the way which humans do. I see no particular reason to believe that biology or physics now contain those concepts, and it may be that to scale the next peak, to make the next step, they will have to focus on this organising concept, and may very well have to broaden their scope in order to come to grips with it.
我想，同样可以提出这样一个问题，即，我们今天所了解的物理科学，也包括生物学，能否吸收这样的一些原则和概念，它们能阐述人类天赋的智慧？更深入一步，就是分析在人类享有自由的条件下使用这种能力的可能性。没有任何理由认为生物学或物理学包含这些概念。为了跨入未来阶段，生物学和物理学可能应该思考组织的概念并扩展它们的领域以便最终占领它们。
FOUCAULT: Yes.
福柯：是的。
ELDERS: Perhaps I may try to ask one more specific question leading out of both your answers, because I'm afraid otherwise the debate will become too technical. I have the impression that one of the main differences between you both has its origin in a difference in approach. You, Mr. Foucault, are especially interested in the way science or scientists function in a certain period, whereas Mr. Chomsky is more interested in the so-called "what-questions": why we possess language; not just how language functions, but what's the reason for our having language. We can try to elucidate this in a more general way: you, Mr. Foucault, are delimiting eighteenth century rationalism, whereas you, Mr. Chomsky, are combining eighteenth-century rationalism with notions like freedom and creativity.
埃勒德：根据两位的回答，我想提一个比较特殊的问题。因为我担心讨论会变得太技术化了。我的印象是你们两位之间主要分歧之一源于解决的方式。您，福柯先生，主要对科学或科学家在既定时期内运作的方式感兴趣，而乔姆斯基先生更关注「为什么」这个问题：为什么我们掌握语言？您关心的并不仅仅是语言如何运作，而且关心基于何种原因我们得以享用它。可以尝试用普通方法弄清这一点：您，福柯先生，界定一下18世纪的唯理主义，而乔姆斯基先生则把它同诸如自由和创造性等观念协调起来。
Perhaps we could illustrate this in a more general way with examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
也许用17、18世纪的例子更能通俗地阐明这一点。
CHOMSKY: Well, first I should say that I approach classical rationalism not really as a historian of science or a historian of philosophy, but from the rather different point of view of someone who has a certain range of scientific notions and is interested in seeing how at an earlier stage people may have been groping towards these notions, possibly without even realising what they were groping towards.
乔姆斯基：首先声明我对待古典唯理主义的态度有别于科学史学家或哲学史学家。作为一个个有某些科学观念的人，我希望发现在历史的一个阶段人们用何种方法无意识地朝着这些观念摸索前进。
So one might say that I'm looking at history not as an antiquarian, who is interested in finding out and giving a precisely accurate account of what the thinking of the seventeenth century was-I don't mean to demean that activity, it's just not mine-but rather from the point of view of, let's say, an art lover, who wants to look at the seventeenth century to find in it things that are of particular value, and that obtain part of their value in part because of the perspective with which he approaches them.
可以说我不像考古学家那样对待历史，他们期望能准确地描绘出17世纪的思想。我决不想降低这种行为的价值，只不过说明这不是我的做法。我像一个钟爱艺术的情人，他研究17世纪是为了从中发现有特殊价值的事物，这是一种因他投去的目光而获新生的价值。
And I think that, without objecting to the other approach, my approach is legitimate; that is, I think it is perfectly possible to go back to earlier stages of scientific thinking on the basis of our present understanding, and to perceive how great thinkers were, within the limitations of their time, groping towards concepts and ideas and insights that they themselves could not be clearly aware of.
与第一种解决方法不矛盾，我想我的观点是在情理之中的，我认为完全有可能以我们目前的理解能力重现科学思想的历史阶段，明白那些大思想家如何摸索着迈向这些概念和思想，他们对此几乎没有意识并受到时代的局限。
For example, I think that anyone can do this about his own thought. Without trying to compare oneself to the great thinkers of the past, anyone can. .
比如我想无论何人都可以借此方法分析自己的思想。并不是想同那些大思想家做对比、无论谁都可以……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：为什么不能比呢？
CHOMSKY: ...look at...
乔姆斯基：考虑……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：为什么不呢？
CHOMSKY: All right [laughs], anyone can consider what he now knows and can ask what he knew twenty years ago, and can see that in some unclear fashion he was striving towards something which he can only now understand ... if he is fortunate.
乔姆斯基：很好，无论什么人都可以思索今天他明白的东西，琢磨20年前他懂得的事物和看到他曾模模糊糊地想搞清楚的事情直到现在才明白……如果他有此幸运的话。
Similarly I think it's possible to look at the past, without distorting your view, and it is in these terms that I want to look at the seventeenth century. Now, when I look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, what strikes me particularly is the way in which, for example, Descartes and his followers were led to postulate mind as a thinking substance independent of the body. If you look at their reasons for postulating this second substance, mind, thinking entity, they were that Descartes was able to convince himself, rightly or wrongly, it doesn't matter at the moment, that events in the physical world and even much of the behavioural and psychological world, for example a good deal of sensation, were explicable in terms of what he considered to be physics-wrongly, as we now believe-that is, in terms of things bumping into each other and turning and moving and so on.
同样我想在保持正确观念的情况下，我们可以看看过去。我就是抱着这种态度看待17世纪的。当我转向17、18世纪时，我被大思想家的探索方法深深吸引。比如笛卡尔和他的弟子们在认定精神是独立于肉体的、能思想的物质时的方法。如果分析一下他们假设精神为第二物质、是能思想的物质的理由时，显然笛卡尔最终相信——对错与否并不重要——物理领域的事情以及行为和心理领域的大部分事物，尤其是感觉，是依据他心目中物理的模式表达出来的：相互移动、碰撞的物体产生对抗等等。——今天我们认为这是错误的方法。
He thought that in those terms, in terms of the mechanical principle, he could explain a certain domain of phenomena; and then he observed that there was a range of phenomena that he argued could not be explained in those terms. And he therefore postulated a creative principle to account for that domain of phenomena, the principle of mind with its own properties. And then later followers, many who didn't regard themselves as Cartesians, for example many who regarded themselves as strongly anti-rationalistic, developed the concept of creation within a system of rule.
他相信这种机械原则能使他阐明某些现象。随后，他发现并不能总是如愿以偿，于是他便假设了创造原则，即精神原则及其特性。在他之后，他的弟子们，其中不乏自称非笛卡尔主义者、坚定的反唯理主义者，他们的规则体系内发展了创造概念。
I won't bother with the details, but my own research into the subject led me ultimately to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who certainly didn't consider himself a Cartesian, but nevertheless in a rather different framework and within a different historical period and with different insight, in a remarkable and ingenious way, which, I think, is of lasting importance, also developed the concept of internalised form-fundamentally the concept of free creation within a system of rule in an effort to come to grips with some of the same difficulties and problems that the Cartesians faced in their terms.
我不细说了。但对这方面的研究最后将我引向了威廉·冯·洪堡。当然他也不认为自己是笛卡尔主义者，但他以独特的方式，在不同的历史阶段发展了内在形式概念。他采用独特的结构、新颖的观点，以工程师的方法——我认为这是必不可少的和持久的方式——发展了这个概念，这就是在通常体系内自由创造的概念。他努力地解决了一些笛卡尔主义者与之奋斗不息的困难和问题。
Now I believe, and here I would differ from a lot of my colleagues, that the move of Descartes to the postulation of a second substance was a very scientific move; it was not a metaphysical or an anti-scientific move. In fact, in many ways it was very much like Newton's intellectual move when he postulated action at a distance; he was moving into the domain of the occult, if you like. He was moving into the domain of something that went beyond well-established science, and was trying to integrate it with well-established science by developing a theory in which these notions could be properly clarified and explained.
同我的许多同事相反，到目前为止，我认为笛卡尔假设第二实体的选择具有科学性，决不是形而上学。在许多方面这类似于牛顿确定远距离作用时的理智选择，但他进入了玄奥领域——怎么说都可以。他进入了超越既定科学的领域，试图发展一个理论，用这个理论恰如其分地、清晰地阐述这些概念，以便反它们纳入科学领域。
Now Descartes, I think, made a similar intellectual move in postulating a second substance. Of course he failed where Newton succeeded; that is, he was unable to lay the groundwork for a mathematical theory of mind, as achieved by Newton and his followers, which laid the groundwork for a mathematical theory of physical entities that incorporated such occult notions as action at a distance and later electromagnetic forces and so on.
笛卡尔用类似的方法确立了第二实体。当然他在牛顿成功的地方失败了。在建立精神数学理论的基础方面他显得无能为力。牛顿和他的弟子们建立了物理实体的数学理论基础，这个基础囊括了玄奥概念、远距离作用及后来的电磁力等。
But then that poses for us, I think, the task of carrying on and developing this, if you like, mathematical theory of mind; by that I simply mean a precisely articulated, clearly formulated, abstract theory which will have empirical consequences, which will let us know whether the theory is right or wrong, or on the wrong track or the right track, and at the same time will have the properties of mathematical science, that is, the properties of rigour and precision and a structure that makes it possible for us to deduce conclusions from assumptions and so on.
于是，不管怎么说，我们负有发展精神数学理论的任务。在此，我的意思是一个结构严谨、表达明确的抽象理论会有知识的结果，能够使我们明白理论正确与否、方向正确与否，并同时具有数学科学的特性、严格性、精确性及结构，使我们能从中获得结论、假说等等。
Now it's from that point of view that I try to look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to pick out points, which I think are really there, even though I certainly recognise, and in fact would want to insist, that the individuals in question may not have seen it this way.
基于这种观点我尝试着观察17、18世纪，以便从中发现业已存在的一些概念。尽管必须承认，我谈到的有关人士并不这样看待17、18世纪。
ELDERS: Mr. Foucault, I suppose you will have a severe criticism of this? \n埃勒德：福柯先生，我想您要严厉地批评这些想法了？
FOUCAULT: No ... there are just one or two little historical points. I cannot object to the account which you have given in your historical analysis of their reasons and of their modality. But there is one thing one could nevertheless add: when you speak of creativity as conceived by Descartes, I wonder if you don't transpose to Descartes an idea which is to be found among his successors or even certain of his contemporaries. According to Descartes, the mind was not so very creative. It saw, it perceived, it was illuminated by the evidence.
福柯：不……仅仅在历史问题上有一两处微不足道的看法。对您的分析我没有相反意见，但我想补充一点：当您谈到类似于笛卡尔构思的创造性时，我想是否您把他的后继者，甚至他的同代人的想法都归于笛卡尔了？笛卡尔认为精神并不十分具有创造性。他观察、思索（「他」应为「它」，指的是精神），从显而易见的事物中得到启示。
Moreover, the problem which Descartes never resolved nor entirely mastered, was that of understanding how one could pass from one of these clear and distinct ideas, one of these intuitions, to another, and what status should be given to the evidence of the passage between them. I can't see exactly either the creation in the moment where the mind grasped the truth for Descartes, or even the real creation in the passage from one truth to another.
此外，笛卡尔从未解决或从未完全掌握的问题是搞清楚人们如何从一个明晰的思想过渡到另一思想，从一个直觉过渡到另一直觉，并赋予这种明显的过渡以何种规则。不管是在笛卡尔认为的精神掌握了真理的时刻，还是在从一个真理转向另一个真理的过程中，我都看不到创造性。
On the contrary, you can find, I think, at the same time in Pascal and Leibniz, something which is much closer to what you are looking for: in other words in Pascal and in the whole Augustinian stream of Christian thought, you find this idea of a mind in profundity; of a mind folded back in the intimacy of itself which is touched by a sort of unconsciousness, and which can develop its potentialities by the deepening of the self. And that is why the grammar of Port Royal, to which you refer, is, I think, much more Augustinian than Cartesian.
相反，在同时期的帕斯卡或莱布尼茨处会找到非常接近您需要的东西。换句话说，在帕斯卡那里以及基督教思想的奥古斯丁学说里都能找到深邃的精神思想、隐藏在自身深处的精神思想。当它被某种无意识触及，便通过自身的深化可以发展它的潜在力量。因此您参用的波特罗亚尔的《语法》，据我看，与其说它是笛卡尔主义的，不如说是奥古斯丁学派的。
And furthermore you will find in Leibniz something which you will certainly like: the idea that in the profundity of the mind is incorporated a whole web of logical relations which constitutes, in a certain sense, the rational unconscious of the consciousness, the not yet clarified and visible form of the reason itself, which the monad or the individual develops little by little, and with which he understands the whole world.
另外，莱布尼茨那里肯定也有使您感兴趣的东西：在精神深处含有一张逻辑关系网。从某种意义上来说，它构成了合理的无意识，构成了看得见却还模糊的理性形态，单子或个体逐渐地发展它，对整个世界的理解也依赖于它。
That's where I would make a very small criticism.
这是我的一点小意见。
ELDERS: Mr. Chomsky, one moment please.
埃勒德：乔姆斯基先生，请稍等一下。
I don't think it's a question of making a historical criticism, but of formulating your own opinions on these quite fundamental concepts...
我不认为有必要做历史方面的评论。我们希望听到您对基本概念的看法。
FOUCAULT: But one's fundamental opinions can be demonstrated in precise analyses such as these.
福柯：可是我们的基本观点需要在准确的分析里被展示，就像刚才谈到的那些。
ELDERS: Yes, all right. But I remember some passages in your History of Madness, which give a description of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in terms of repression, suppression and exclusion, while for Mr. Chomsky this period is full of creativity and individuality.
埃勒德：是的，很好。但我记得在您的《疯狂史》里有几处描写17、18世纪的段落，您使用了镇压、消灭和排斥等字眼；而在乔姆斯基先生看来，这是一个充满创造力和人性的时期。
Why do we have at that period, for the first time, closed psychiatric or insane asylums? I think this is a very fundamental question...
为什么在这个时期开始出现了拘留所？我想这是个重要问题……
FOUCAULT: ...on creativity, yes!
福柯：……对于创造性来说，是应充分肯定的！
But I don't know, perhaps Mr. Chomsky would like to speak about it...
但我不清楚。也许乔姆斯基先生想就此谈谈……
ELDERS: No, no, no, please go on. Continue.
埃勒德：不，不，不，请您接下去说。
FOUCAULT: No, I would like to say this: in the historical studies that I have been able to make, or have tried to make, I have without any doubt given very little room to what you might call the creativity of individuals, to their capacity for creation, to their aptitude for inventing by themselves, for originating concepts, theories or scientific truths by themselves.
福柯：我只想简单地说一下。在我所能做的或我曾努力做的历史研究中，毫无疑问，在被你们称之为个体创造能力方面及他们发明概念、理论或科学真理的才能方面，我留下的地方很小。
But I believe that my problem is different to that of Mr. Chomsky. Mr. Chomsky has been fighting against linguistic behaviourism, which attributed almost nothing to the creativity of the speaking subject; the speaking subject was a kind of surface on which information came together little by little, which he afterwards combined.
我认为构的问题与乔姆斯基先生的有所不同。他是反对语言行为主义的，因为语言行为主义否定语言主体的创造性，认为语言主体是承载逐渐汇集起来的信息并随后加以组合的一种截面。
In the field of the history of science or, more generally, the history of thought, the problem was completely different.
在科学史领域内，或更广泛地说，在思想史领域内，问题则完全不同。
The history of knowledge has tried for a long time to obey two claims. One is the claim of attribution: each discovery should not only be situated and dated, but should also be attributed to someone; it should have an inventor and someone responsible for it. General or collective phenomena on the other hand, those which by definition can't be "attributed", are normally devalued: they are still traditionally described through words like "tradition', "mentality", "modes"; and one lets them play the negative role of a brake in relation to the "originality" of the inventor. In brief, this has to do with the principle of the sovereignty of the subject applied to the history of knowledge. The other claim is that which no longer allows us to save the subject, but the truth: so that it won't be compromised by history, it is necessary not that the truth constitutes itself in history, but only that it reveals itself in it; hidden to men's eyes, provisionally inaccessible, sitting in the shadows, it will wait to be unveiled. The history of truth would be essentially its delay, its fall or the disappearance of the obstacles which have impeded it until now from coming to light. The historical dimension of knowledge is always negative in relation to the truth. It isn't difficult to see how these two claims were adjusted, one to the other: the phenomena of collective order, the "common thought", the "prejudices" of the "myths" of a period, constituted the obstacles which the subject of knowledge had to surmount or to outlive in order to have access finally to the truth; he had to be in an "eccentric" position in order to "discover". At one level this seems to be invoking a certain "romanticism" about the history of science: the solitude of the man of truth, the originality which reopened itself onto the original through history and despite it. I think that, more fundamentally, it's a matter of superimposing the theory of knowledge and the subject of knowledge on the history of knowledge.
认识史长斯以来致力于服从两个需求。首先是授予的需求；每项发明不仅需要确定时间、地点，而且还要确定授予何人。它需要一位发明者，一位它的负责人。普通的或集体的项目由于不能授予的特性而自然贬值。通常都用类似于「传统」、「思想」和「方式」等字词来描述，因而只能起到受抑制的负作用，根本无法与发明者的「独创性」相比。简言之，这与认识史上的主体至高无上原则有关。第二个需求，它不允许挽救主体，而要挽救真理。为了不让真理被历史左右，真理不必非在历史中构成不可，而仅仅在其中显露而已。它蜷缩在阴影里，躲开众人的目光，令人一时难以接近，它等待着被揭示。真理的历史主要的就是真理的姗姗来迟，它的失败，或者去消灭目前仍阻挡它进入光明的各种障碍。与真理相比，认识史的重要性总是被否定的。不难看出这两个需求紧密交错：类型相同的现象、相同的思想、对一个时期幻想的偏见，构成了诸多障碍。认识科学应当克服这些障碍以便最终进入真理，并应当位于中心位置之外以显露自己。从某种程度上来说，这似乎带给科学史某种浪漫情调；掌握真理之人的孤独、创造性不经意地从历史中寻到了它的根。我想，更基本的应把认识的理论和认识的主体放进认识的历史中。
And what if understanding the relation of the subject to the truth, were just an effect of knowledge? What if understanding were a complex, multiple, non-individual formation, not "subjected to the subject", which produced effects of truth? One should then put forward positively this entire dimension which the history of science has negativised; analyse the productive capacity of knowledge as a collective practice; and consequently replace individuals and their "knowledge" in the development of a knowledge which at a given moment functions according to certain rules which one can register and describe.
理解主体与真理的关系是否仅是认识的作用呢？理解是不是一种复杂、多样的构成？是不是非个人的、独立于主体及能够产生真理的作用呢？那就该对它的重要性予以肯定，这一点是科学史曾予扬弃的。应该把知识的生产能力作为集体实践来分析，并在知识发展中重新安排个体及他们的知识的位置。在既定时刻，知识发展依据某些规则运作，人们可以记录和描绘这些规则。
You will say to me that all the Marxist historians of science have been doing this for a long time. But when one sees how they work with these facts and especially what use they make of the notions of consciousness, of ideology as opposed to science, one realises that they are for the main part more or less detached from the theory of knowledge.
你们会说马克思主义的科学史学家早就做这项工作了。但当看清他们是如何对待这些事实，尤其是他们用觉悟和意识形态同科学相对立的方法，大家就会清楚他们或多或少脱离了认识理论。
In any case, what I am anxious about is substituting transformations of the understanding for the history of the discoveries of knowledge. Therefore I have, in appearance at least, a completely different attitude to Mr. Chomsky apropos creativity, because for me it is a matter of effacing the dilemma of the knowing subject, while for him it is a matter of allowing the dilemma of the speaking subject to reappear.
至于我，我尤为关注的是用理解转换来替代认识的发明史。这样，至少在表面上我同乔姆斯基先生在对待创造性上有天壤之别。因为在我这里是消除认识主体的窘况，而他呢，是希望再现语言主体的窘况。
But if he has made it reappear, if he has described it, it is because he can do so. The linguists have for a long time now analysed language as a system with a collective value. The understanding as a collective totality of rules allowing such and such a knowledge to be produced in a certain period, has hardly been studied until now. Nevertheless, it presents some fairly positive characteristics to the observer. Take for example medicine at the end of the eighteenth century: read twenty medical works, it doesn't matter which, of the years 1770 to 1780, then twenty others from the years 1820 to 1830, and I would say, quite at random, that in forty or fifty years everything had changed; what one talked about, the way one talked about it, not just the remedies, of course, not just the maladies and their classifications, but the outlook itself. Who was responsible for that? Who was the author of it? It is artificial, I think, to say Bichat, or even to expand a little and to say the first anatomical clinicians. It's a matter of a collective and complex transformation of medical understanding in its practice and its rules. And this transformation is far from a negative phenomenon: it is the suppression of a negativity, the effacement of an obstacle, the disappearance of prejudices, the abandonment of old myths, the retreat of irrational beliefs, and access finally freed to experience and to reason; it represents the application of an entirely new grille, with its choices and exclusions; a new play with its own rules, decisions and limitations, with its own inner logic, its parameters and its blind alleys, all of which lead to the modification of the point of origin. And it is in this functioning that the understanding itself exists. So, if one studies the history of knowledge, one sees that there are two broad directions of analysis: according to one, one has to show how, under what conditions and for what reasons, the understanding modifies itself in its formative rules, without passing through an original "inventor" discovering the "truth"; and according to the other, one has to show how the working of the rules of an understanding can produce in an individual new and unpublished knowledge. Here my aim rejoins, with imperfect methods and in a quite inferior mode, Mr. Chomsky's project: accounting for the fact that with a few rules or definite elements, unknown totalities, never even produced, can be brought to light by individuals. To resolve this problem, Mr. Chomsky has to reintroduce the dilemma of the subject in the field of grammatical analysis. To resolve an analogous problem in the field of history with which I am involved, one has to do the opposite, in a way: to introduce the point of view of understanding, of its rules, of its systems, of its transformations of totalities in the game of individual knowledge. Here and there the problem of creativity cannot be resolved in the same way, or rather, it can't be formulated in the same terms, given the state of disciplines inside which it is put.
他做到了这一点，因为这是可行的。长期以来语言学家们分析语言如同分析具有共同价值的一个系统。理解作为规则的共同总体性允许这种或那种认识进入某个时期，但直到目前却从未被研究过。但理解表现出了一些正面的特征，举18世纪末医学界为例。随便翻开一本1770年至1780年的医书，读上二十几页；然后再看二十几页1820年至1830年的一本医书。经过四、五十年后发生了巨大的变化。无论人们谈及的内容还是说话的方式，当然不仅仅是药方，也不仅仅是疾病或疾病分类，还有人们的眼界及看问题的角度都有巨变。谁对此变化负有主要责任？谁是此变化的创造者？回答说是比沙或是第一批支持临床解剖学的人，则有些牵强附会。这是医学认识在实践与规则里发生的复杂而共同的转化，这个转化不是消极现象。消除了消极性，铲除了障碍，纠正了偏见，抛弃了空想，无理性信仰的退却，最后总算自由地进入了理性和体验。这表现出了栅栏作用。一个全新的、有筛选功能的栅栏；一个有自己的规则、决定和界限的，有自己内部逻辑、参数和死路的，总之这是一个与最初相比具有引向变革特点的新工具。理解便蕴涵在这种功能里。如果研究一下认识史，便会看到两种分析方向。依照第一种方向，应该表示出理解在已形成的规则里如何，在何种条件下，及源于何种原因进行着改变，并未经过发现「真理」的原始「发明者」；依照第二种方向，应该显示出理解原则如何能够在个体身上产生出新的、前所未有的认识。此时，我的工作与乔姆斯基先生的计划衔接上了。我的工作方法欠完善，方式也差。依赖某些明确的因素，一些从未出现过的、不被人们所知的总体性才能被人们揭示开来。为了解决这个问题，乔姆斯基先生应把主体的窘境再引进语法分析领域内。在我的历史范围内，为了解决一个类似的问题，却要使用相反的方法：把理解观点，它的规则，它的体系，它的总体性的转化引进个体认识的运作规则里。不管是哪种方法，创造性这个问题不能用同一种方法解决，或者说，不能用相同的词语表达出来，因为它所属的学科不尽相同。
CHOMSKY: I think in part we're slightly talking at cross-purposes, because of a different use of the term creativity. In fact, I should say that my use of the term creativity is a little bit idiosyncratic and therefore the onus falls on me in this case, not on you. But when I speak of creativity, I'm not attributing to the concept the notion of value that is normal when we speak of creativity. That is, when you speak of scientific creativity, you're speaking, properly, of the achievements of a Newton. But in the context in which I have been speaking about creativity, it's a normal human act.
乔姆斯基：我想，由于对创造性这个词的用法不同，我们俩人有些分歧。实际上，我使用此词的方式略有其特殊性，这个责任全在于我。当我谈及这个词时，我没有赋予这个概念通常所具有的价值观念。当谈到科学创造性，人们便联想到比如牛顿的创造。但在我援引此字的背景里，是人类的一般活动。
I'm speaking of the kind of creativity that any child demonstrates when he's able to come to grips with a new situation: to describe it properly, react to it properly, tell one something about it, think about it in a new fashion for him and so on. I think it's appropriate to call those acts creative, but of course without thinking of those acts as being the acts of a Newton.
我所说的创造性是任何一个儿童在新的环境里所表现出来的斗争：他学习恰到好处地描写这个环境，恰如其分地对它产生反应，谈论它，用一种对孩子来说是新鲜的方式来思索它。我想可以把这种行为看作是创造性，但未必是属于牛顿式的创造行为。
In fact it may very well be true that creativity in the arts or the sciences, that which goes beyond the normal, may really involve properties of, well, I would also say of human nature, which may not exist fully developed in the mass of mankind, and may not constitute part of the normal creativity of everyday life.
也许在艺术和科学领域里的创造性需要某些特性，这种特性不属于人类大众，也不是日常生活中的一般创造性。
Now my belief is that science can look forward to the problem of normal creativity as a topic that it can perhaps incorporate within itself. But I don't believe, and I suspect you will agree, that science can look forward, at least in the reasonable future, to coming to grips with true creativity, the achievements of the great artist and the great scientist. It has no hope of accommodating these unique phenomena within its grasp. It's the lower levels of creativity that I've been speaking of.
我确信科学可以纳入一般创造性的主题。但我并不认为（漏翻了and I suspect you will agree）在短时期内它便可以同真正的创造性、同一个伟大的艺术家或一个大学者的事业相抗衡，它毫无将这些非凡奇才据为己有的希望，我所说的是创造性的最低档次。
Now, as far as what you say about the history of science is concerned, I think that's correct and illuminating and particularly relevant in fact to the kinds of enterprise that I see lying before us in psychology and linguistics and the philosophy of the mind.
您关于科学史的观点我认为非常正确、清晰，并完全符合我们在心理学、语言学和精神哲学领域里要做的工作。
That is, I think there are certain topics that have been repressed or put aside during the scientific advances of the past few centuries.
我认为在最近几个世纪，随着科学的进步，某些词汇被取消或排挤出去了。
For example, this concern with low-level creativity that I'm referring to was really present in Descartes also. For example, when he speaks of the difference between a parrot, who can mimic what is said, and a human, who can say new things that are appropriate to the situation, and when he specifies that as being the distinctive property that designates the limits of physics and carries us into the science of the mind, to use modern terms, I think he really is referring to the kind of creativity that I have in mind; and I quite agree with your comments about the other sources of such notions.
如我使用的低层次的创造性在笛卡尔那里就出现过。当笛卡尔谈及鹦鹉与人的区别时，他认为鹦鹉具有复制语言的能力，而人则可以说出适应情景的新东西。他明确提出这个显著特性，指出了物理的限度，并把我们引入精神科学。为了使用现代词汇，我记得他使用了类似于创造性这样的词。我同意您关于这些观念的其他出处的意见。
Well, these concepts, even in fact the whole notion of the organisation of sentence structure, were put aside during the period of great advances that followed from Sir William Jones and others and the development of comparative philology as a whole.
这些概念——事实上，句子结构组织的所有观念——在随威廉·琼斯及其他人而来的巨大进步时期和比较语文学发展中都被排除了。
But now, I think, we can go beyond that period when it was necessary to forget and to pretend that these phenomena did not exist and to turn to something else. In this period of comparative philology and also, in my view, structural linguistics, and much of behavioural psychology, and in fact much of what grows out of the empiricist tradition in the study of mind and behaviour, it is possible to put aside those limitations and bring into our consideration just those topics that animated a good deal of the thinking and speculation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to incorporate them within a much broader and I think deeper science of man that will give a fuller role-though it is certainly not expected to give a complete understanding to such notions as innovation and creativity and freedom and the production of new entities, new elements of thought and behaviour within some system of rule and schematism. Those are concepts that I think we can come to grips with.
但是目前，我想我们应该是度过了必须遗忘、必须声称这些现象并不存在以便转向其他事物的时代。在这个比较语文学时代——我认为同时也是结构语言学时代、行为主义心理学时代及所有那些源于精神和行为研究的知识传统时代——有可能排除这些界限，重视那些给予17、18世纪大部分思想和思辨以活力的词汇，并可能把它们融入一个更广泛、更深入的人的科学里。这门科学将把更广泛的角色给予众多观念，诸如革新、创造性、自由、新实体的产生，思想新要素的产生及其规则体系和模式里的行为产生等等，这是一些我们可以掌握的概念。
ELDERS: Well, may I first of all ask you not to make your answers so lengthy? [Foucault laughs.]
埃勒德：首先我能否请您不要回答得这么长？
When you discuss creativity and freedom, I think that one of the misunderstandings, if any misunderstandings have arisen, has to do with the fact that Mr. Chomsky is starting from a limited number of rules with infinite possibilities of application, whereas you, Mr. Foucault, are stressing the inevitability of the "grille" of our historical and psychological determinisms, which also applies to the way in which we discover new ideas.
当你们谈论创造性和自由时，我想有一个误会，如果有的话。这个误会来源自乔姆斯基先生从有限的规则同操作的无限可能性出发；而您，福柯先生，您强调心理及历史决定论的「栅栏」的不可避免性，它也作用于我们发现新思想的方法。
Perhaps we can sort this out, not by analysing the scientific process, but just by analysing our own thought process.
也许，不分析科学程序而分析我们自己的思想程序，可以解决这个问题。
When you discover a new fundamental idea, Mr. Foucault, do you believe, that as far as your own personal creativity is concerned something is happening that makes you feel that you are being liberated; that something new has been developed? Perhaps afterwards you discover that it was not so new. But do you yourself believe that, within your own personality, creativity and freedom are working together, or not?
当您发现了一个重要的新思想，福柯先生，这涉及到您个人的创造性，您认为这件事是自由的象征，是某个新事物的诞生吗？您可能随后发现这是个错误吗？您认为在您的品格里，创造性和自由同时在起作用吗？
FOUCAULT: Oh, you know, I don't believe that the problem of personal experience is so very important...
福柯：噢，要知道，我不认为个人经验问题很重要……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：为什么？
FOUCAULT: ...in a question like this. No, I believe that there is in reality quite a strong similarity between what Mr. Chomsky said and what I tried to show: in other words there exist in fact only possible creations, possible innovations. One can only, in terms of language or of knowledge, produce something new by putting into play a certain number of rules which will define the acceptability or the grammaticality of these statements, or which will define, in the case of knowledge, the scientific character of the statements.
福柯：……在这个问题上。不，事实上我认为在乔姆斯基先生所讲的及我试图表明的之间存在着极为相似的东西。换句话说，事实上只有可能的创造，可能的革新。在语言及认识领域只有让一些规则发挥作用才能产生一些新东西。这些规则会确定叙述的可接受性或是否符合语法规则。在认识范围内，这些规则或许会确定叙述的科学性。
Thus, we can roughly say that linguists before Mr. Chomsky mainly insisted on the rules of construction of statements and less on the innovation represented by every new statement, or the hearing of a new statement. And in the history of science or in the history of thought, we placed more emphasis on individual creation, and we had kept aside and left in the shadows these communal, general rules, which obscurely manifest themselves through every scientific discovery, every scientific invention, and even every philosophical innovation.
因此，在乔姆斯基先生之前的语言学家特别重视叙述结构的规则而并不强调新叙述中所表现出的革新或对它的接受。在科学史或思想史中，人们习惯于重视个人的创造而把一般的规则类型撇在一边。而恰是后者在整个科学发现、整个科学发明中默默地起作用，甚至也贯穿于整个哲学革新中。
And to that degree, when I no doubt wrongly believe that I am saying something new, I am nevertheless conscious of the fact that in my statement there are rules at work, not only linguistic rules, but also epistemological rules, and those rules characterise contemporary knowledge.
在这方面，当我错误地以为我说出了什么新东西时，我意识到事实上在我的叙述中有规则在起作用，并不仅仅是语言学规则，还有知识规则，它们构成了现代认识的特点。
CHOMSKY: Well, perhaps I can try to react to those comments within my own framework in a way which will maybe shed some light on this.
乔姆斯基：我试着用更清晰的方法谈谈这些论点。
Let's think again of a human child, who has in his mind some schematism that determines the kind of language he can learn. Okay. And then, given experience, he very quickly knows the language, of which this experience is a part, or in which it is included.
回过头来再看看孩子们的例子。儿童具有了一些模式，它可以确定儿童所能学会的语言方式。那好，以他的经验，儿童很快地学会了作为此经验一部分的语言，或者说是包含在此经验里的语言。
Now this is a normal act; that is, it's an act of normal intelligence, but it's a highly creative act.
这是正常的行为，是标准的智力行为，是具有相当创造性的行为。
If a Martian were to look at this process of acquiring this vast and complicated and intricate system of knowledge on the basis of this ridiculously small quantity of data, he would think of it as an immense act of invention and creation. In fact, a Martian would, I think, consider it as much of an achievement as the invention of, let's say, any aspect of a physical theory on the basis of the data that was presented to the physicist.
如果一个火星人注意到了建立在极为有限的材料基础上的庞大复杂的知识获取程序，他会认为这是一个巨大发明，是创造性行为。事实上我想，火星人会认为这是一个成功，可以同物理学家在自己掌握的材料基础上发明了物理理论相媲美。
However, if this hypothetical Martian were then to observe that every normal human child immediately carries out this creative act and they all do it in the same way and without any difficulty, whereas it takes centuries of genius to slowly carry out the creative act of going from evidence to a scientific theory, then this Martian would, if he were rational, conclude that the structure of the knowledge that is acquired in the case of language is basically internal to the human mind; whereas the structure of physics is not, in so direct a way, internal to the human mind. Our minds are not constructed so that when we look at the phenomena of the world theoretical physics comes forth, and we write it down and produce it; that's not the way our minds are constructed.
然而，如果这个火星人发现所有正常儿童都能很快完成这个创造性行为，没有丝毫困难，方法也都相似，而摸索出它的科学理论却需要几代奇才的共同努力，火星人自然会得出在语言方面获取知识的结构位于人类精神的里面的结论。而物理结构不是这样直接的。人们观察世上的一种现象，物理理论便会从中涌现出来，我们只要把它记录下来、生产出来就可以了。精神不是这样的，我们的精神不是这样构成的。
Nevertheless, I think there is a possible point of connection and it might be useful to elaborate it: that is, how is it that we are able to construct any kind of scientific theory at all? How is it that, given a small amount of data, it's possible for various scientists, for various geniuses even, over a long period of time, to arrive at some kind of a theory, at least in some cases, that is more or less profound and more or less empirically adequate?
但我认为存在一个交点，应该也对它进行研究：我们怎样做才能制定出一个科学理论来？尤其当看到一些学者及一些天才所掌握的材料是那样的少，即使用了相当长的时间，但最后却得到了一个或多或少比较深刻的理论，而此理论能与实践相吻合。
This is a remarkable fact.
这是令人赞叹的。
And, in fact, if it were not the case that these scientists, including the geniuses, were beginning with a very narrow limitation on the class of possible scientific theories, if they didn't have built into their minds somehow an obviously unconscious specification of what is a possible scientific theory, then this inductive leap would certainly be quite impossible: just as if each child did not have built into his mind the concept of human language in a very restricted way, then the inductive leap from data to knowledge of a language would be impossible.
事实上，如果这些科学家，包括那些天才不是在极为有限的条件下开始他们的可能存在的科学理论研究的话，就没有可能实现归纳性的跳跃。同样，一个儿童如果没有极为有制约的人类语言概念的话，就永远不会出现从素材到语言知识的归纳性跳跃。
So even though the process of, let's say, deriving knowledge of physics from data is far more complex, far more difficult for an organism such as ours, far more drawn out in time, requiring intervention of genius and so on and so forth, nevertheless in a certain sense the achievement of discovering physical science or biology or whatever you like, is based on something rather similar to the achievement of the normal child in discovering the structure of his language: that is, it must be achieved on the basis of an initial limitation, an initial restriction on the class of possible theories. If you didn't begin by knowing that only certain things are possible theories, then no induction would be possible at all. You could go from data anywhere, in any direction. And the fact that science converges and progresses itself shows us that such initial limitations and structures exist.
当然，依据材料进行知识分流的程序在物理领域里要复杂得多，对于像我们人体一样的组织来说也更为困难，需要相当长的时间，必需天才的介入。从某种意义上说，物理学或生物科学或其他学科的成功都建立在某种程序之上，这种程序类似正常儿童发现语言结构的程序。这个程序应该在最初的限制基础上，在可能存在的理论分类的制约基础上得以完成。如果最初人们就不知道只有某些材料可以通向理论，那么任何归纳法都无从谈起，材料可以把你引向任何方向。科学自行汇合和进步的事实说明起初的限制和这些结构都是存在的。
If we really want to develop a theory of scientific creation, or for that matter artistic creation, I think we have to focus attention precisely on that set of conditions that, on the one hand, delimits and restricts the scope of our possible knowledge, while at the same time permitting the inductive leap to complicated systems of knowledge on the basis of a small amount of data. That, it seems to me, would be the way to progress towards a theory of scientific creativity, or in fact towards any question of epistemology.
如果我们确实想发展科学创造的理论，或者在这种情况下发展艺术创造理论，我想我们应准确地把注意力集中在总体条件上。一方面这些条件限制和制约了我们可能获得的知识面，而另一方面，它们又使我们得以实现通向知识复杂体系的归纳性跳跃。我认为这条道路可以通向科学创造性的理论，或者找到解决认识问题的办法。
ELDERS: Well, I think if we take this point of the initial limitation with all its creative possibilities, I have the impression that for Mr. Chomsky rules and freedom are not opposed to each other, but more or less imply each other. Whereas I get the impression that it is just the reverse for you, Mr. Foucault. What are your reasons for putting it the opposite way, for this really is a very fundamental point in the debate, and I hope we can elaborate it.
埃勒德：那好。假如我们接受这个最初限制及它的所有创造可能性的说法。我的印象是在乔姆斯基先生那里规则和自由是不相抵触，它们相互包含；而在福柯先生那里却正好相反。您这样认为的理由是什么？这是今天这场辩论会的重点，希望我们能深入地谈一谈。
To formulate the same problem in other terms: can you think of universal knowledge without any form of repression?
为了换个角度，您能否使用大众知识形式，没有任何抑制地谈一下这个问题？
FOUCAULT: Well, in what Mr. Chomsky has just said there is something which seems to me to create a little difficulty; perhaps I understood it badly.
福柯：好吧，可能我未很好地理解乔姆斯基先生所讲的话，但我觉得有一个小难点。
I believe that you have been talking about a limited number of possibilities in the order of a scientific theory. That is true if you limit yourself to a fairly short period of time, whatever it may be. But if you consider a longer period, it seems to me that what is striking is the proliferation of possibilities by divergences.
我认为您谈了在科学理论方面的一些可能性的限制。如果您局限在一个比较短的时期蚋，情况的确是这样的。但如果您涉及到一个长的时期，令人惊奇的是辐散状的可能性的膨胀。
For a long time the idea has existed that the sciences, knowledge, followed a certain line of "progress", obeying the principle of "growth", and the principle of the convergence of all these kinds of knowledge. And yet when one sees how the European understanding, which turned out to be a world-wide and universal understanding in a historical and geographical sense, developed, can one say that there has been growth? I, myself, would say that it has been much more a matter of transformation.
长期以来，人们曾认为科学、知识是循着某条「进步」的路线，服从于「增长」的原则和汇聚各种各样知识的原则。但是当看到欧洲的理解方式是如何发展的，在历史和地域方面它最后成为世界的和普遍的理解方式，我们还能说这是增长吗？我看还不如说是转变。
Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications. How often have they not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules: by symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of evolution. Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. You have there a principle of divergence, much more than one of growth. I would much rather say that there are many different ways of making possible simultaneously a few types of knowledge. There is, therefore, from a certain point of view, always an excess of data in relation to possible systems in a given period, which causes them to be experienced within their boundaries, even in their deficiency, which means that one fails to realise their creativity; and from another point of view, that of the historian, there is an excess, a proliferation of systems for a small amount of data, from which originates the widespread idea that it is the discovery of new facts which determines movement in the history of science.
咱们以动物和植物的分类为例。从中世纪以来，根据截然不同的规则，人们已经重写多少遍了？有从符号学角度分类的，有从自然史、从人体比较解剖学、从进化论等各种角度分类的。而每一次重写都使知识在它的功能、结构、内部关系方面发生全新的变化。这里有一个辐散原则，它远远超过增长原则。我更倾向于认为有众多方式都可以使少量知识同时得以实现。因此，从某种观点看，在一特定时期内总是有与可能系统相关的材料过剩情况，它促使在局限的贫乏的条件下进行实验，但却阻碍了创造性。从另一观点看，即从史学家的观点看，总是系统过多过滥而材料相应不足。因而普遍产生了这样的想法：科学史的进程取决于新现象的发现。
CHOMSKY: Here perhaps again, let me try to synthesise a bit. I agree with your conception of scientific progress; that is, I don't think that scientific progress is simply a matter of the accumulated addition of new knowledge and the absorption of new theories and so on. Rather I think that it has this sort of jagged pattern that you describe, forgetting certain problems and leaping to new theories. .
乔姆斯基：我概括一下我的想法。我同意您关于科学进步的观念。就是说我不认为这是个新知识积累的问题、而是汲取新理论的问题，等等。（这里是并列关系不是转折关系，用「而是」不妥）更确切地说，我认为它是走着一条您描绘的弯弯曲曲的路，同时置某些问题于脑后以便赶紧占有新的理论。
FOUCAULT: And transforming the same knowledge.
福柯：和转变相同的知识。
CHOMSKY: Right. But I think that one can perhaps hazard an explanation for that. Oversimplifying grossly, I really don't mean what I'm going to say now literally, one might suppose that the following general lines of an explanation are accurate: it is as if, as human beings of a particular biologically given organisation, we have in our heads, to start with, a certain set of possible intellectual structures, possible sciences. Okay?
我想还可以深入地解释一下。简言之，我下面要说的大体上假设为正确的：作为一个特定的生物学构造的人类，一开始在我们头脑里就有某种可能存在的智力结构的规则、某个可能存在的科学的规则。
Now, in the lucky event that some aspect of reality happens to have the character of one of these structures in our mind, then we have a science: that is to say that, fortunately, the structure of our mind and the structure of some aspect of reality coincide sufficiently so that we develop an intelligible science.
如果有幸，现实中的一个现象有我们头脑里的某个结构的特点，我们便拥有了一门学科。也就是说，极为幸运，我们头脑的结构和现实现象的结构恰到好处地吻合了，我们就发展了一门显而易懂的学科。
It is precisely this initial limitation in our minds to a certain kind of possible science which provides the tremendous richness and creativity of scientific knowledge. It is important to stress-and this has to do with your point about limitation and freedom-that were it not for these limitations, we would not have the creative act of going from a little bit of knowledge, a little bit of experience, to a rich and highly articulated and complicated array of knowledge. Because if anything could be possible, then nothing would be possible.
就是我们头脑中的这种对某些学科的原始限制提供了科学知识的巨大财富和创造性。有必要强调一下，如果没有这些限制我们就不可能有创造行为。这是从微不足道的知识、不足挂齿的经验中把我们引导到极为复杂、清晰的知识和创造行为。现在我又回到限制与自由的关系问题上了。因为如果一切都是可能的，那就没有什么是可能的了。
But it is precisely because of this property of our minds, which in detail we don't understand, but which, I think, in a general way we can begin to perceive, which presents us with certain possible intelligible structures, and which in the course of history and insight and experience begin to come into focus or fall out of focus and so on; it is precisely because of this property of our minds that the progress of science, I think, has this erratic and jagged character that you describe.
恰恰由于我们头脑里的这种特性，我们得以发现某些有可能理解的结构。我们对头脑的这种特性还未有细致的了解，但已开始发现它了。这种特性在历史的长河中、在研究的进展中、在经验的积累中时隐时现……也正是由于这种特性，科学的进步具有您描绘的混沌、碰撞之特点。
That doesn't mean that everything is ultimately going to fall within the domain of science. Personally I believe that many of the things we would like to understand, and maybe the things we would most like to understand, such as the nature of man, or the nature of a decent society, or lots of other things, might really fall outside the scope of possible human science.
这并不意味着最终一切都被包括进科学领域之中。我个人认为许多我们不惜任何代价企盼能够理解的东西，比如人性、情理社会的性质及许多其他问题，事实上都是人文科学力所不能及的。
ELDERS: Well, I think that we are confronted again with the question of the inner relation between limitation and freedom. Do you agree, Mr. Foucault, with the statement about the combination of limitation, fundamental limitation? .
埃勒德：我想我们又一次面对限制与自由之间的原始关系问题。福柯先生，您是否肯定同意限制的组合、基本的限制……
FOUCAULT: It is not a matter of combination. Only creativity is possible in putting into play of a system of rules; it is not a mixture of order and freedom.
福柯：这不是组合问题。只有从规则体系出发才谈得上可能的创造性，这不是自由与规则的掺和。
Where perhaps I don't completely agree with Mr. Chomsky, is when he places the principle of these regularities, in a way, in the interior of the mind or of human nature.
可能我与乔姆斯基先生意见不完全一致的地方是他把规则性的原则置于可以说是精神或人性的内部。
If it is a matter of whether these rules are effectively put to work by the human mind, all right; all right, too, if it is a question of whether the historian and the linguist can think it in their turn; it is all right also to say that these rules should allow us to realise what is said or thought by these individuals. But to say that these regularities are connected, as conditions of existence, to the human mind or its nature, is difficult for me to accept: it seems to me that one must, before reaching that point-and in any case I am talking only about the understanding-replace it in the field of other human practices, such as economics, technology, politics, sociology, which can serve them as conditions of formation, of models, of place, of apparition, etc. I would like to know whether one cannot discover the system of regularity, of constraint, which makes science possible, somewhere else, even outside the human mind, in social forms, in the relations of production, in the class struggles, etc.
如果问题在于这些规则是否的确通过人的精神在发挥作用，很好；史学家和语言学家是否能来思考一下这个问题，很好，那么这些规则就应该使我们能够掌握这些个体的言论和思想。但我们难以接受这些规则与人的精神或人的性质有关联的说法。如同生存条件一样：我觉得在触及这点之前，应把这些规则置于人类实践的其他领域中去，如经济、技术、政治以及社会的实践中去。这些领域能为这些规则提供形成条件、显露条件及范例。我设想使科学成为可能的这个规则体系、制约体系似乎也存在于其他地方，甚至在人类精神之外，存在于社会形式中、生产关系中、阶级斗争里等等。
For example, the fact that at a certain time madness became an object for scientific study, and an object of knowledge in the West, seems to me to be linked to a particular economic and social situation.
比如在某些时期，疯狂成为欧洲科学研究和学问的主题，这个事实使我觉得它同经济形势、独特的社会形势有关联。
Perhaps the point of difference between Mr. Chomsky and myself is that when he speaks of science he probably thinks of the formal organisation of knowledge, whereas I am speaking of knowledge itself, that is to say, I think of the content of various knowledges which is dispersed into a particular society, permeates through that society, and asserts itself as the foundation for education, for theories, for practices, etc.
可能乔姆斯基先生与我之间的分歧在于当他谈及科学时，他大概想到的是知识的形式组织，而我谈的是知识本身，也就是说各种分散在特定社会里的知识内容，它在这个社会里无处不在，构成教育、理论、实践等的基础。
ELDERS: But what does this theory of knowledge mean for your theme of the death of man or the end of the period of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries?
埃勒德：这种知识理论同您的19－20世纪末的人类死亡主题相比意味着什么？
FOUCAULT: But this doesn't have any relation to what we are talking about.
福柯：这同咱们今天谈论的事情毫无关系。
ELDERS: I don't know, because I was trying to apply what you have said to your anthropological notion. You have already refused to speak about your own creativity and freedom, haven't you? Well, I'm wondering what are the psychological reasons for this.
埃勒德：我不知道。我只是想把您说过的话运用到您的人类学概念中去。您已经拒绝谈论您自己的创造性和您的自由，不是吗？我想是什么心理因素……
FOUCAULT: [Protesting.] Well, you can wonder about it, but I can't help that.
福柯：好吧，您可以去想，但我帮不了忙。
ELDERS: Ah, well.
埃勒德：噢，是吗。
FOUCAULT: I am not wondering about it.
福柯：这不关我的事。
ELDERS: But what are the objective reasons, in relation to your conception of understanding, of knowledge, of science, for refusing to answer these personal questions?
埃勒德：但您拒绝回答有关您个人问题的客观理由是什么呢？这同您的理解概念、知识概念、科学概念有关。
When there is a problem for you to answer, what are your reasons for making a problem out of a personal question?
在您解决问题时，为什么要把个个的事转变成问题呢？
FOUCAULT: No, I'm not making a problem out of a personal question; I make of a personal question an absence of a problem.
不，我并未把个人的事当作一个问题，对我来说个人的事不是问题。
Let me take a very simple example, which I will not analyse, but which is this: How was it possible that men began, at the end of the eighteenth century, for the first time in the history of Western thought and of Western knowledge, to open up the corpses of people in order to know what was the source, the origin, the anatomical needle, of the particular malady which was responsible for their deaths?
我举一个非常简单的例子，不加任何分析。在18世纪末期，人类如何能够剖开尸体以便找出致死的根源呢？这在西方的思想认识史中是前所未有的。
The idea seems simple enough. Well, four or five thousand years of medicine in the West were needed before we had the idea of looking for the cause of the malady in the lesion of a corpse.
原因似乎很简单。但这是西方医学界用了四千年或五千年的时间才产生出从病损尸体中寻找病因的想法。
If you tried to explain this by the personality of Bichat, I believe that would be without interest. If, on the contrary, you tried to establish the place of disease and of death in society at the end of the eighteenth century, and what interest industrial society effectively had in quadrupling the entire population in order to expand and develop itself, as a result of which medical surveys of society were made, big hospitals were opened, etc.; if you tried to find out how medical knowledge became institutionalised in that period, how its relations with other kinds of knowledge were ordered, well, then you could see how the relationship between disease, the hospitalised, ill person, the corpse, and pathological anatomy were made possible.
要从比沙的个性中寻找答案我想是没有意义的。相反，如果你给18世纪末社会的疾病和死亡问题一席之地，注意到这个工业社会的人中增加了4倍，而这是对社会展开了健康调查并开设了大医院的结果；如果再努力搞清楚医学知识在此期间是如何巩固下来的，它同其他形式的知识是如何结合在一起的，就会掌握疾病、病人、医院里的病员、尸体和病理解剖学之间的关系了。
Here is, I believe, a form of analysis which I don't say is new, but which in any case has been much too neglected; and personal events have almost nothing to do with it.
我认为这就是一种分析形式。我并不认为它是新方法，但却被人极为忽视。个人的事情在这方面一般不起任何作用。
ELDERS: Yes, but nevertheless it would have been very interesting for us to know a little bit more about your arguments to refute this.
埃勒德：好的，但我们还是希望能更充分地了解您的理由。
Could you, Mr. Chomsky-and as far as I'm concerned, it's my last question about this philosophical part of the debate-give your ideas about, for example, the way the social sciences are working? I'm thinking here especially about your severe attacks on behaviourism. And perhaps you could even explain a little the way Mr. Foucault is now working in a more or less behaviouristic way. [Both philosophers laugh.]
乔姆斯基先生，您是否能和我们谈谈社会科学运作的方式？这是这场讨论会哲学部分的最后一个问题。这尤其使我想到您给予行为主义的严厉抨击。或许您还可以解释一下福柯先生目前使用的或多或少的行为主义方式。
CHOMSKY: I would like to depart from your injunction very briefly, just to make one comment about what Mr. Foucault just said.
在满足您的要求之前，我希望简单地概述一下福柯先生刚才的一席话。
I think that illustrates very nicely the way in which we're digging into the mountain from opposite directions, to use your original image. That is, I think that an act of scientific creation depends on two facts: one, some intrinsic property of the mind, another, some set of social and intellectual conditions that exist. And it is not a question, as I see it, of which of these we should study; rather we will understand scientific discovery, and similarly any other kind of discovery, when we know what these factors are and can therefore explain how they interact in a particular fashion.
我想这番话恰到好处地说明了您对我们的写照：我们俩人分头在一座大山下挖隧道。我认为科学创造行为依附于两点：首先是精神内在的特性，其次是社会条件和智力条件的特定总体。问题不在于搞清我们应研究其中的哪一个。当我们了解并能够解释这些因素相互起作用的方式后，我们便理解了科学发明及其他发现。
My particular interest, in this connection at least, is with the intrinsic capacities of the mind; yours, as you say, is in the particular arrangement of social and economic and other conditions.
我尤其对精神的内在能力感兴趣，而您尤为关注的是社会、经济和其他方面条件的组织。
FOUCAULT: But I don't believe that difference is connected to our characters-because at this moment it would make Mr. Elders right, and he must not be right.
福柯：但我不认为分歧同我们的性格有关。如若有关的话，埃勒德就得理了，而他不应有理。
CHOMSKY: No, I agree, and...
乔姆斯基：对，我同意，但……
FOUCAULT: It's connected to the state of knowledge, of knowing, in which we are working. The linguistics with which you have been familiar, and which you have succeeded in transforming, excluded the importance of the creative subject, of the creative speaking subject; while the history of science such as it existed when people of my generation were starting to work, on the contrary, exalted individual creativity. .
福柯：这同知识状态有关，同我们在工作中的认识有关。您对语言学驾轻就熟，并已成功地将它进行了改造，排除了创造性主体，即创造性言语主体的重要性。但科学史就不同了，当我们这辈人着手开始研究它时，它已对个体的创造性大为赞扬……
CHOMSKY: Yes.
乔姆斯基：是的。
FOUCAULT: ...and put aside these collective rules.
福柯：……并避开共同规则。
CHOMSKY: Yes, yes.
QUESTION: Ah...
ELDERS: \nYes, please go on.
QUESTION: It goes a bit back in your discussion, but what I should like to know, Mr. Chomsky, is this: you suppose a basic system of what must be in a way elementary limitations that are present in what you call human nature; to what extent do you think these are subject to historical change? Do you think, for instance, that they have changed substantially since, let's say, the seventeenth century? In that case, you could perhaps connect this with the ideas of Mr. Foucault?
一名与会者：我想往前追溯一下你们的讨论。乔姆斯基先生，我想知道的是您从根本上设想了一个基本限制体系，它体现在您称之为人性的概念里面。您认为它在何种程度上受制于历史的变迁呢？举例说，您认为自从17世纪它们就被大量地进行改造了吗？在此情况下，您能否把这种观点同福柯先生的观点相联系呢？
CHOMSKY: Well, I think that as a matter of biological and anthropological fact, the nature of human intelligence certainly has not changed in any substantial way, at least since the seventeenth century, or probably since Cro-Magnon man. That is, I think that the fundamental properties of our intelligence, those that are within the domain of what we are discussing tonight, are certainly very ancient; and that if you took a man from five thousand or maybe twenty thousand years ago, and placed him as a child within today's society, he would learn what everyone else learns, and he would be a genius or a fool or something else, but he wouldn't be fundamentally different.
乔姆斯基：好吧，我想这是个生物学和人类学方面的问题。从17世纪以来，人的智力特点肯定没有多大变化，可能从克罗马农人算起也没有多大变化。我想我们智力的主要特性，这是今晚讨论会中经常提及的，肯定是相当古老的。如果一个五千年前或两万年前的人转世到当今社会的一个孩子身上，他能够像其他所有人一样学会各种东西。也许他会是一个奇才，也可能是个笨蛋，但肯定不会有本质差异。
But, of course, the level of acquired knowledge changes, social conditions change-those conditions that permit a person to think freely and break through the bonds of, let's say, superstitious constraint. And as those conditions change, a given human intelligence will progress to new forms of creation. In fact this relates very closely to the last question that Mr. Elders put, if I can perhaps say a word about that.
当然获取知识的水平发生了变化，社会条件也变化了。这使当代人可以自由地思考、斩断同迷信压近的关系。随着这些条件的变化，一定的人类智力朝着新的创造方式进步。这也是对埃勒德先生最后一个问题的回答。对此我想再说一点。
Take behavioural science, and think of it in these contexts. It seems to me that the fundamental property of behaviourism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term behavioural science, is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory. That is, what defines behaviourism is the very curious and self-destructive assumption that you are not permitted to create an interesting theory.
让我们把行为主义科学放在这一背景中看看。行为科学这个怪词使我联想起行为主义的主要特性，我感觉这个特性对发展科学理论的可能性起着负作用。好奇的和自毁的假设为行为主义下了定义，据此假设，我们不可能创立一个有意义的理论。
If physics, for example, had made the assumption that you have to keep to phenomena and their arrangement and such things, we would be doing Babylonian astronomy today. Fortunately physicists never made this ridiculous, extraneous assumption, which has its own historical reasons and had to do with all sorts of curious facts about the historical context in which behaviourism evolved.
举例说，如果物理学提出的假设是以现象及其表现为本，那么我们今天仍在研究巴比伦的天文。幸好物理学家们从未提出这种荒谬可笑的假设。但这种假设有其历史缘由并涉及在历史背景中的所有各种奇异事物，行为主义便是在此背景下得以发展的。
But looking at it purely intellectually, behaviourism is the arbitrary insistence that one must not create a scientific theory of human behaviour; rather one must deal directly with phenomena and their interrelation, and no more something which is totally impossible in any other domain, and I assume impossible in the domain of human intelligence or human behaviour as well. So in this sense I don't think that behaviourism is a science. Here is a case in point of just the kind of thing that you mentioned and that Mr. Foucault is discussing: under certain historical circumstances, for example those in which experimental psychology developed, it was-for some reason which I won't go into-interesting and maybe important to impose some very strange limitations on the kind of scientific theory construction that was permitted, and those very strange limitations are known as behaviourism. Well, it has long since run its course, I think. Whatever value it may have had in 1880, it has no function today except constraining and limiting scientific inquiry and should therefore simply be dispensed with, in the same way one would dispense with a physicist who said: you're not allowed to develop a general physical theory, you're only allowed to plot the motions of the planets and make up more epicycles and so on and so forth. One forgets about that and puts it aside. Similarly one should put aside the very curious restrictions that define behaviourism; restrictions which are, as I said before, very much suggested by the term behavioural science itself.
如果从纯精神角度看这个问题，行为主义可概括为武断地禁止建立一个人类行为的科学理论。此外它还开始直接研究现象及现象之间的关系，仅此而已。这在其他领域里是绝对不可能的事情，在智力或人类行为领域也绝对行不通。在此意义上说，我不认为行为主义是一种科学。我现在回答您的问题，回到福柯先生谈到的问题上来。在历史的某些环境中，比如说实验心理学发展的环境中，把奇怪的限制强加于可信的科学理论的建设中是令人感兴趣的，也是非常重要的，这种限制被称为行为主义。出于某种考虑，在此我不详加解释了。这种想法曾盛行一时。在1880年，这种想法可能具有某些价值，但是现在，它唯一的作用就是限制和扼杀科学调查，因此应该干脆摆脱它。正如一位物理学家所说：「你们无权提出一个普通物理学的理论，而只有研究天体运动和发现新本轮的权利。」人们忘记了这些。必须摆脱确定行为主义的奇怪限制，这些限制本身由行为科学的词汇表达出来的。
We can agree, perhaps, that behaviour in some broad sense constitutes the data for the science of man. But to define a science by its data would be to define physics as the theory of meter-readings. And if a physicist were to say: yes, I'm involved in meter-reading science, we could be pretty sure that he was not going to get very far. They might talk about meter-readings and correlations between them and such things, but they wouldn't ever create physical theory.
从广义上看，行为构成了人文科学的素材，我们同意这点。但通过这些素材来确定一门科学便又回到把物理学确定为阅读测量仪器的理论上了。如果有一位物理学家声称：「我致力于阅读测量方面的理论。」肯定他不会走出多远。他可以谈论测量，谈论测量之间的关系，但却永远创立不出一个物理学理论。
And so the term itself is symptomatic of the disease in this case. We should understand the historical context in which these curious limitations developed, and having understood them, I believe, discard them and proceed in the science of man as we would in any other domain, that is by discarding entirely behaviourism and in fact, in my view, the entire empiricist tradition from which it evolved.
在这种情况下，词语仅是征候性的。我们应该了解这些奇怪限制发展的历史背景，然后就像在其他领域里一样抛开它，在人类科学方面继续前进，同时彻底淘汰行为主义。依我看，还有其他所有源自行为主义的经验论传统。
QUESTION: So you are not willing to link your theory about innate limitations, with Mr. Foucault's theory of the "grille". There might be a certain connection. You see, Mr. Foucault says that an upsurge of creativity in a certain direction automatically removes knowledge in another direction, by a system of "grilles". Well, if you had a changing system of limitations, this might be connected.
一与会者：您并不期望把您的天赋限制理论同福柯先生的「栅栏」理论相沟通，可能在这两者之间存在着某种关系。比如说福柯先生认为在某些方面的剩余创造性通过「栅栏」理论相沟通，可能在这两者之间存在着某种关系。比如说福柯先生认为在某些方面的剩余创造性通过「栅栏」体系自动转换了知识。如果您的限制体系做一变动的话，您们的观点就十分接近了。
CHOMSKY: Well, the reason for what he describes, I think, is different. Again, I'm oversimplifying. We have more possible sciences available intellectually. When we try out those intellectual constructions in a changing world of fact, we will not find cumulative growth. What we will find are strange leaps: here is a domain of phenomena, a certain science applies very nicely; now slightly broaden the range of phenomena, then another science, which is very different, happens to apply very beautifully, perhaps leaving out some of these other phenomena. Okay, that's scientific progress and that leads to the omission or forgetting of certain domains. But I think the reason for this is precisely this set of principles, which unfortunately, we don't know, which makes the whole discussion rather abstract, which defines for us what is a possible intellectual structure, a possible deep-science, if you like.
乔姆斯基：我认为这些理由是不同的。我讲得过于简单了。很多的可实现的科学在理智在是可以理解的。当我们在一个千变万化的世界里检验精神结构时，我们得不到累积的增长，却得到奇怪的距离：对某些现象解释得极好，但对某些现象又解释不了。有些人忘记了这些。这是科学进步的一部分，同时也导致了遗漏或遗忘某些领域。这个过程的原因恰恰就是原则的总体。不幸的是我们还不了解这个总体，这使得所有的确定结构讨化，一个深奥的科学讨论变得十分抽象。
ELDERS: Well, let's move over now to the second part of the discussion, to politics. First of all I would like to ask Mr. Foucault why he is so interested in politics, because he told me that in fact he likes politics much more than philosophy.
埃勒德：让我们过渡到讨论会的第二部分：政治。首先我想问下福柯先生，这是您对我说过的，为什么您对政治和哲学倾注了同样的热情？
FOUCAULT: I've never concerned myself, in any case, with philosophy. But that is not a problem. [He laughs.]
我从未搞过哲学，但问题不在这儿。
Your question is: why am I so interested in politics? But if I were to answer you very simply, I would say this: why shouldn't I be interested? That is to say, what blindness, what deafness, what density of ideology would have to weigh me down to prevent me from being interested in what is probably the most crucial subject to our existence, that is to say the society in which we live, the economic relations within which it functions, and the system of power which defines the regular forms and the regular permissions and prohibitions of our conduct. The essence of our life consists, after all, of the political functioning of the society in which we find ourselves.
您的问题是：为什么我也非常热衷于政治？为了简捷地回答您，我说：为什么我不能热衷于它？什么样的聋哑、失明，什么样林林总总的思想体系能有权阻止我对我们最重要的生存问题的关注呢？这是我们生活于其中的社会，在其中运行经济关系并确定合法形式、决定我们行为准则的体制。我们生活的至关重要的焦点是我们所在社会的政治运作。
So I can't answer the question of why I should be interested; I could only answer it by asking why shouldn't I be interested?
同样我也无法回答关于我为什么对此热心投入的问题。我只能以为什么我不应对此热衷来回答您。
ELDERS: You are obliged to be interested, isn't that so?
埃勒德：您不得不热衷于此，是这样的吗？
FOUCAULT: Yes, at least, there isn't anything odd here which is worth question or answer. Not to be interested in politics, that's what constitutes a problem. So instead of asking me, you should ask someone who is not interested in politics and then your question would be well-founded, and you would have the right to say "Why, damn it, are you not interested?" [They laugh and the audience laughs.]
福柯：是的，至少如此。对于值得探讨的问题这没有什么好奇怪的。对政治无动于衷这会是个真正的问题。去对一个不关心政治的人提此问题吧，而不要对我。那样您有权对他高声问道：「怎么，您对此不感兴趣？」
ELDERS: Well, yes, perhaps. Mr. Chomsky, we are all very interested to know your political objectives, especially in relation to your well-known anarcho-syndicalism or, as you formulated it, libertarian socialism. What are the most important goals of your libertarian socialism?
埃勒德：是的，可能会这样。乔姆斯基先生，我们所有人都特别想了解您的政治目标，尤其是同无政府工团主义的关系，或者就像您亲自下的定义那样，您同自由社会主义的关系。它的主要目标是什么呢？
CHOMSKY: I'll overcome the urge to answer the earlier very interesting question that you asked me and turn to this one.
乔姆斯基：我忍痛割爱先不回答您前一个问题，这是个非常有意思的问题。我先回答现在这个问题。
Let me begin by referring to something that we have already discussed, that is, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximise the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue.
首先我要谈一个我们已经说过的话题。如果我没有搞错的话，那就是人性的一个基本要素是对创造性劳动的需要，对创造性研究的需要，对没有强制法规专横限制的自由创造的需要，由此产生的一个情理社会应能最大限度地提供实现人类基本特性的可能性。这意味着要战胜压抑、压迫、破坏、限制诸因素，它们存在于所有的社会中，像历史垃圾一样存在于我们的社会之中。
Now any form of coercion or repression, any form of autocratic control of some domain of existence, let's say, private ownership of capital or state control of some aspects of human life, any such autocratic restriction on some area of human endeavour, can be justified, if at all, only in terms of the need for subsistence, or the need for survival, or the need for defence against some horrible fate or something of that sort. It cannot be justified intrinsically. Rather it must be overcome and eliminated.
所有生存领域里的强制、压抑和专制控制的形式，比如资本的私有或国家在某些方面对人类生活的控制，所有强有加于人类活动的限制，只有当它们仅是根据生存需要或与恐怖命运抗争时才能是合法的。它不可能本质性地合法，还不如将它摒弃。
And I think that, at least in the technologically advanced societies of the West we are now certainly in a position where meaningless drudgery can very largely be eliminated, and to the marginal extent that it's necessary, can be shared among the population; where centralised autocratic control of, in the first place, economic institutions, by which I mean either private capitalism or state totalitarianism or the various mixed forms of state capitalism that exist here and there, has become a destructive vestige of history.
我想，至少在科技方面比较先进的西方社会里，我们能够避免这些无用的、令人不快的需要。在某些范围内，可以同人民分享特权。经济体制的中央专制控制——我所指的既是私营资本主义也是国家极权政体，还包括那些分布在各处的国家资本主义五花八门的混杂形式——这些已成为历史的破坏性残渣余孽。
They are all vestiges that have to be overthrown, eliminated in favour of direct participation in the form of workers' councils or other free associations that individuals will constitute themselves for the purpose of their social existence and their productive labour.
所有这些残余都应被清除以利于劳工委员会或自由结合式的直接参与，这是个体在他们社会生活范围和生产劳动范围内的自己的组织。
Now a federated, decentralised system of free associations, incorporating economic as well as other social institutions, would be what I refer to as anarcho-syndicalism; and it seems to me that this is the appropriate form of social organisation for an advanced technological society, in which human beings do not have to be forced into the position of tools, of cogs in the machine. There is no longer any social necessity for human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that can be overcome and we must overcome it by a society of freedom and free association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will.
一个联邦的、分散的自由结合的体制在吸收了经济和社会的规章后就会构成被我所称的无政府工团主义。我觉得对于一个先进的科技社会，这是适合社会结构的形式。在这样的社会里，人类个体不会被变成工具、机械的齿轮。不再有把人类个体当成生产线上的链环的社会需要。我们应该通过一个自由的社会和一个自由结合的社会来达到这一目的。在这样的社会里，人性固有的创造冲动能够以它自己界定的方式得以充分实现。
And again, like Mr. Foucault, I don't see how any human being can fail to be interested in this question. [Foucault laughs.]
重申一下，正如福柯先生所说，我不清楚一个人怎么能对这个问题无动于衷。
ELDERS: Do you believe, Mr. Foucault, that we can call our societies in anyway democratic, after listening to this statement from Mr. Chomsky?
埃勒德：福柯先生，听完乔姆斯基先生的一番话，您认为能把我们的社会看作民主社会吗？
FOUCAULT: No, I don't have the least belief that one could consider our society democratic. [Laughs.]
福柯：不，我们的社会绝不是民主社会。
If one understands by democracy the effective exercise of power by a population which is neither divided nor hierarchically ordered in classes, it is quite clear that we are very far from democracy. It is only too clear that we are living under a regime of a dictatorship of class, of a power of class which imposes itself by violence, even when the instruments of this violence are institutional and constitutional; and to that degree, there isn't any question of democracy for us.
如果民主意味着由人民有效地行使权力，并不按等级被划分成阶级，那么十分明显，我们离此还差得很远。同样十分明显，我们生活在一个阶级专政的制度里，一个通过暴力树立威望的阶级权力的制度里，即使这个暴力工具已成为制度和符合宪法。就某种程度讲，对我们来说根本谈不上什么民主。
Well. When you asked me why I was interested in politics, I refused to answer because it seemed evident to me, but perhaps your question was: How am I interested in it?
好，当您问我为什么热衷于政治时，我未予回答。因为我觉得这是显而易见的事情。但您的问题是否是：您热衷政治的方法是什么？
And had you asked me that question, and in a certain sense I could say you have, I would say to you that I am much less advanced in my way; I go much less far than Mr. Chomsky. That is to say that I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society.
您应当提出这个问题，您已经以某种方式这样做了。我会说我的方法十分落后，我远远落后于乔姆斯基先生。就是说我承认我既无能力确定也无有力的理由提出一个针对我们这个科学或工艺社会的理想社会运作模式。
On the other hand, one of the tasks that seems immediate and urgent to me, over and above anything else, is this: that we should indicate and show up, even where they are hidden, all the relationships of political power which actually control the social body and oppress or repress it.
相反，我认为比任何问题都更加紧急迫切的一个问题是：我们应指出和表明目前控制和抑制我们社会肌体的政治权力的所有关系，甚至当这些关系被遮盖时亦如此。
What I want to say is this: it is the custom, at least in European society, to consider that power is localised in the hands of the government and that it is exercised through a certain number of particular institutions, such as the administration, the police, the army, and the apparatus of the state. One knows that all these institutions are made to elaborate and to transmit a certain number of decisions, in the name of the nation or of the state, to have them applied and to punish those who don't obey. But I believe that political power also exercises itself through the mediation of a certain number of institutions which look as if they have nothing in common with the political power, and as if they are independent of it, while they are not.
我想说的是，至少在欧洲社会里，人们习惯地认为权力仅限于掌握在政府手中，并由于某些特殊机构诸如政府行政部门、警察局、军队和国家机器而得以行使权力。人们清楚这些机构的建立便是为了以民族或国家的名义制订和传达一些决定、执行这些决定和处分不服从决定者。但是，我认为政治权力的实施还间接地取决于一些表面上与政治权力无任何干系，似乎独立于政治权力之外而实则不然的机构。
One knows this in relation to the family; and one knows that the university and in a general way, all teaching systems, which appear simply to disseminate knowledge, are made to maintain a certain social class in power; and to exclude the instruments of power of another social class.
可以通过家庭、学校来明白这点。大致上说，学校体制从外表上看是分配知识的，而实际上是为某个阶级掌握政权而将其他所有阶级排挤出权力机构而服务的。
Institutions of knowledge, of foresight and care, such as medicine, also help to support the political power. It's also obvious, even to the point of scandal, in certain cases related to psychiatry.
教育机构、谋略机构和治疗机构比如医学都是帮助支持政治权力的。同精神病学有关的某些事例成为明显的丑闻。
It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.
我觉得在我们这样的社会里，真正的政治任务是抨击那些表面上看来中立或独立的机构的作用，把在其中暗中作祟的政治暴力揭示出来，以便大家共同与之斗争。
This critique and this fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are centres and invisible, little-known points of support; its true resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn't expect it. Probably it's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate the point of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is exercised. And because this domination is not simply the expression in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and, to a large extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of the other. Well, if one fails to recognise these points of support of class power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary process.
我认为这种批评和战斗是重要的，原因首先是政治的影响要比人们想象的大得多，它有许多隐藏的中心和几乎不被人知的支撑点。它真实的力量处于人们料想不到的地方。也许只说在政府身后、在国家机器的后边还有一个统治阶级是不够的。用政治术语说并不仅仅是经济剥削一种表现，它还是政权的工具，很大程度上是使政权得以实现的条件。清晰地辨别出两者之一，便可以消灭另一个。如果看不清阶级权力的支撑点，就有允许它们继续存在的危险和在表面的革命过程之后重新建立阶级权力的危险。
CHOMSKY: Yes, I would certainly agree with that, not only in theory but also in action. That is, there are two intellectual tasks: one, and the one that I was discussing, is to try to create the vision of a future just society; that is to create, if you like, a humanistic social theory that is based, if possible, on some firm and humane concept of the human essence or human nature. That's one task.
对，我完全同意这点，不仅在理论上，行动上亦如此。我们有两个脑力任务要完成，一个是我谈到过的关于尝试建立一个未来的公正社会的设想，一个正确的人道主义的社会理论。可能的话，这个理论是建立在人性本质的牢固概念之上。这是第一个任务。
Another task is to understand very clearly the nature of power and oppression and terror and destruction in our own society. And that certainly includes the institutions you mentioned, as well as the central institutions of any industrial society, namely the economic, commercial and financial institutions and in particular, in the coming period, the great multi-national corporations, which are not very far from us physically tonight [i.e. Philips at Eindhoven].
第二个任务是要清醒地懂得在我们的社会中权力的性质、压迫的性质及顾坏的性质。这里当然包括您提及的机构：工业社会中的中央机构，即经济、金融和商业部门。在不远的将来，还有那些大的跨国公司。今晚他们离我们就不远。（恩德霍芬的飞利浦公司！）
Those are the basic institutions of oppression and coercion and autocratic rule that appear to be neutral despite everything they say: well, we're subject to the democracy of the market place, and that must be understood precisely in terms of their autocratic power, including the particular form of autocratic control that comes from the domination of market forces in an inegalitarian society.
这些机构是压近、强制、专制法律的主要机构。不管他们如何说我们是依附于市场民主的，而实则他们是依据专制权力行事。其中包括控制的特殊形式，这是源于不平等社会的市场力量统治的形式。
Surely we must understand these facts, and not only understand them but combat them. And in fact, as far as one's own political involvements are concerned, in which one spends the majority of one's energy and effort, it seems to me that they must certainly be in that area. I don't want to get personal about it, but my own certainly are in that area, and I assume everyone's are.
我们肯定应懂得这些事实，并应与之战斗。我认为这些现象已存在于我们的政治战斗中，它们消耗着我们的能量和努力。我不想说有关这方面的个人经历了，但我想我投入政治活动的动力及其他所有人的动力皆源于此。
Still, I think it would be a great shame to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and philosophical task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human characteristics, and to relate that to some notion of social structure in which those properties could be realised and in which meaningful human life could take place.
然而，我认为完全避开比较深邃的、哲学的任务是令人羞愧的。这个任务是在已将全部身心给予了自由、尊严和创造性的人性概念与其他基本人性特点之间建立联系，是将人性概念同社会结构概念相连接。在这个社会结构里人性的特性得以实现，具有全部意义的人类生活受到重视。
And in fact, if we are thinking of social transformation or social revolution, though it would be absurd, of course, to try to sketch out in detail the goal that we are hoping to reach, still we should know something about where we think we are going, and such a theory may tell it to us.
实际上，如果我们思考一下社会变革或社会革命，尽管详细确实我们遵循的目标的想法是不现实的，但我们可能会清楚应往哪里去。这一类的理论问题能告诉我们答案。
FOUCAULT: Yes, but then isn't there a danger here? If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities which allow it to realise itself...that's really what you have said, I believe.
福柯：是的。但这里难道没有风险吗？当您说存在着某种人性，这种人性在目前的社会里未获得实现的权利和实现的可能性……这是您说过的，我想。
CHOMSKY: Yes.
乔姆斯基：对。
FOUCAULT: And if one admits that, doesn't one risk defining this human nature which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and repressed until now - in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilisation, from our culture?
福柯：当人们接受了这种看法时，难道没有从我们的社会、我们的文明、我们的文化中套用词汇来确定这种人性的危险吗？这种人性直到目前仍是既理想又现实的，它被抑制着、隐蔽着。
I will take an example by greatly simplifying it. The socialism of a certain period, at the end of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth century, admitted in effect that in capitalist societies man hadn't realised the full potential for his development and self-realisation; that human nature was effectively alienated in the capitalist system. And it dreamed of an ultimately liberated human nature.
我举一个比较简单的例子。在某个时期，19世纪末及20世纪初时，社会主义认为在资本主义社会里人得不到发展和实现自己的所有可能性，因而人性在资本主义制度下肯定会异化。社会主义幻想着一种自由的人性。
What model did it use to conceive, project, and eventually realise that human nature? It was in fact the bourgeois model.
社会主义用什么样板来构思、设想、实现这种人性呢？事实上他用的是资本主义样板。
It considered that an alienated society was a society which, for example, gave pride of place to the benefit of all, to a sexuality of a bourgeois type, to a family of a bourgeois type, to an aesthetic of a bourgeois type. And it is moreover very true that this has happened in the Soviet Union and in the popular democracies: a kind of society has been reconstituted which has been transposed from the bourgeois society of the nineteenth century. The universalisation of the model of the bourgeois has been the utopia which has animated the constitution of Soviet society.
社会主义认为摆脱束缚的社会是一个重视——比如说——资产阶级式的性欲、资产阶级式的家庭、资产阶级式的美学的社会。在苏联的人民民主下发生的一切完全证实了这一点：照搬19世纪的某个社会。资产阶级样板的普及化便是社会主义的理想，它启迪了苏维埃社会的构成。
The result is that you too realised, I think, that it is difficult to say exactly what human nature is.
结果是，您也十分清楚，确定人性是多么困难的事。
Isn't there a risk that we will be led into error? Mao Tse-Tung spoke of bourgeois human nature and proletarian human nature, and he considers that they are not the same thing.
难道这是是促使我们犯错误的地方吗？毛泽东说到过资产阶级人性和无产阶级人性，他认为这不是一回事儿。
CHOMSKY: Well, you see, I think that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action, namely, that of being impelled to do something, because the problems are so great, and yet knowing that whatever we do is on the basis of a very partial understanding of the social realities, and the human realities in this case.
乔姆斯基：您知道，我想，在政治行动的智力领域里，我们在这个领域里试图建立一个以人性概念为基础的公正、自由社会、我们面临在直接政治行动中碰到的相同问题，即由于问题的重要性，我们感到有必要采取行动。但我们也意识到我们对社会现实、也就是人类现实的理解是片面的。
For example, to be quite concrete, a lot of my own activity really has to do with the Vietnam War, and some of my own energy goes into civil disobedience. Well, civil disobedience in the U.S. is an action undertaken in the face of considerable uncertainties about its effects. For example, it threatens the social order in ways which might, one might argue, bring about fascism; and that would be a very bad thing for America, for Vietnam, for Holland and for everyone else. You know, if a great Leviathan like the United States were really to become fascist, a lot of problems would result; so that is one danger in undertaking this concrete act.
比如，具体些说，我工作的一个重要部分同越南战争有关，同时我还密切关注民间的反抗。在美国，民间反抗构成了极不稳定的因素。举例说，它以可能导致法西斯主义的危险威胁着社会秩序，这对美国来说是极为有害的，同时可能危及越南、荷兰及所有其他国家。要知道，如果像美国这样的利维坦真的成了法西斯将会产生许多问题。因此，在这个具体行动中便会有危险。
On the other hand there is a great danger in not undertaking it, namely, if you don't undertake it, the society of Indo-China will be torn to shreds by American power. In the face of these uncertainties one has to choose a course of action.
此外，如果我们不冒此险，印支社会便会被美国的强力击得粉碎。而对这种不稳定应该选择一种行动方式。
Well, similarly in the intellectual domain, one is faced with the uncertainties that you correctly pose. Our concept of human nature is certainly limited; it's partially socially conditioned, constrained by our own character defects and the limitations of the intellectual culture in which we exist. Yet at the same time it is of critical importance that we know what impossible goals we're trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge, while remaining very open to the strong possibility, and in fact overwhelming probability, that at least in some respects we're very far off the mark.
同样在智力领域里也存在着不稳定，您已极为正确地指出了这一点。我们的人性概念肯定有局限性，它部分地受到社会的制约，也受到我们自身缺点及我们生存于其中的智力文化的局限。同时，当我们企盼达到某些可能达到的目标时，重要的是要了解那些我们为之奋斗却难以接近的目标。这意味着我们应该相当勇敢，在拥有部分知识的基础上提出假设、发明社会理论。同时向大量的可能性及窥伺我们的概率极高的失败开放，至少在某些领域里要这样。
ELDERS: Well, perhaps it would be interesting to delve a little deeper into this problem of strategy. I suppose that what you call civil disobedience is probably the same as what we call extra-parliamentary action?
埃勒德：对，深入讨论这个战略问题是有意义的。我想您称之为民间反抗的行动是否就是我们所理解的议会外行动？
CHOMSKY: No, I think it goes beyond that.
乔姆斯基：不，差得远。
Extra-parliamentary action would include, let's say, a mass legal demonstration, but civil disobedience is narrower than all extra-parliamentary action, in that it means direct defiance of what is alleged, incorrectly in my view, by the state to be law.
议会外行动包括群众的合法示威，而民间反抗范围比较窄，它包含对国家号称的法律进行挑战，我认为国家在这方面是错误的。
ELDERS: So, for example, in the case of Holland, we had something like a population census. One was obliged to answer questions on official forms. You would call it civil disobedience if one refused to fill in the forms?
埃勒德：那么以荷兰的情况为例，那里进行了一次人口普查，我们要回答一些官方问卷。拒不填写问卷是否是民间反抗？
CHOMSKY: Right. I would be a little bit careful about that, because, going back to a very important point that Mr. Foucault made, one does not necessarily allow the state to define what is legal. Now the state has the power to enforce a certain concept of what is legal, but power doesn't imply justice or even correctness, so that the state may define something as civil disobedience and may be wrong in doing so.
乔姆斯基：正是。在这个问题上我是比较谨慎的。用讨论会的重点、福柯先生的重要进展来说，并非必然由国家确定何为合法。现在国家有权把某个合法的概念强加于人，这并不意味着公正：国家对民间反抗的定义完全有可能搞错。
For example, in the United States the state defines it as civil disobedience to, let's say, derail an ammunition train that's going to Vietnam; and the state is wrong in defining that as civil disobedience, because it's legal and proper and should be done. It's proper to carry out actions that will prevent the criminal acts of the state, just as it is proper to violate a traffic ordinance in order to prevent a murder.
比如在美国，颠覆一列运住越南的军需品货车是民间反抗行为。国家错了，因为这是一个合法的、必需的、恰如其分的行动。展开一个阻止国家犯罪的行动是绝对正确的，这就像为了阻止谋杀而讳反交通规则一样。
If I had stopped my car in front of a traffic light which was red, and then I drove through the red traffic light to prevent somebody from, let's say, machine-gunning a group of people, of course that's not an illegal act, it's an appropriate and proper action; no sane judge would convict you for such an action.
如果为了阻止机枪扫射一群人，我闯了红灯，这不是违法行为，而是救助处于危险状况群众的行为。任何一个智力健全的法官都不会怪罪我。
Similarly, a good deal of what the state authorities define as civil disobedience is not really civil disobedience: in fact, it's legal, obligatory behaviour in violation of the commands of the state, which may or may not be legal commands.
国家权力机关认定的民间反抗是合法的、不得已的行为。它违反了国家的命令，不管这些命令合法与否。
So one has to be rather careful about calling things illegal, I think.
当谈及不合法的事情时应倍加小心。
FOUCAULT: Yes, but I would like to ask you a question. When, in the United States, you commit an illegal act, do you justify it in terms of justice or of a superior legality, or do you justify it by the necessity of the class struggle, which is at the present time essential for the proletariat in their struggle against the ruling class?
福柯：是这样的。但我想向您提个问题。在美国，当您干了件违法的事儿，您是根据理想的公正还是上层的合法性、或者通过阶级斗争的需要来解释它？因为现在对于无产阶级来说这是在同统治阶级斗争时非常重要的问题。
CHOMSKY: Well, here I would like to take the point of view which is taken by the American Supreme Court and probably other courts in such circumstances; that is, to try to settle the issue on the narrowest possible grounds. I would think that ultimately it would make very good sense, in many cases, to act against the legal institutions of a given society, if in so doing you're striking at the sources of power and oppression in that society.
乔姆斯基：我喜欢采纳美国最高法院和其他类似法庭的观点，即在尽可能严格的情况下解决问题。最终我认为在大多数情况下，如果采取行动反对特定社会的合法机构能够动摇这个社会的杈力和压近的根基的话，那么这个行动是合乎情理的。
However, to a very large extent existing law represents certain human values, which are decent human values; and existing law, correctly interpreted, permits much of what the state commands you not to do. And I think it's important to exploit the fact...
但从广义来看，现行的法律体现出某些人类的价值，这是应该受到尊重的价值，正确解释法律可以钻国家命令的空子。我想重要的是利用这一点……
FOUCAULT: Yeah.
福柯：对。
CHOMSKY: ...it's important to exploit the areas of law which are properly formulated and then perhaps to act directly against those areas of law which simply ratify some system of power.
乔姆斯基：……和开发那些被正确确定的法律领域。随后或许要采取直接行动反对那些认可权力制度的人。
FOUCAULT: But, but, I, I...
福柯：但是，我……
CHOMSKY: Let me get...
乔姆斯基：让我说完……
FOUCAULT: My question, my question was this: when you commit a clearly illegal act...
福柯：我的问题是这样的，当您做了一件明显违法……
CHOMSKY: ...which I regard as illegal, not just the state.
乔姆斯基：不仅是国家认为违法，我也认为是违法的。
FOUCAULT: No, no, well, the state's...
福柯：不，不，仅是国家认为是违法。
CHOMSKY: ...that the state regards as illegal...
乔姆斯基：……国家认为是违法……
FOUCAULT: ...that the state considers as illegal.
福柯：……国家认为是违法……
CHOMSKY: Yeah.
乔姆斯基：好的。
FOUCAULT: Are you committing this act in virtue of an ideal justice, or because the class struggle makes it useful and necessary ? Do you refer to ideal justice, that's my problem.
福柯：您的这种行为是依照公正的原理还是由于阶级斗争而成为必要？您考虑到理想的公正了吗？这就是我想提的问题。
CHOMSKY: Again, very often when I do something which the state regards as illegal, I regard it as legal : that is, I regard the state as criminal. But in some instances that's not true. Let me be quite concrete about it and move from the area of class war to imperialist war, where the situation is somewhat clearer and easier.
乔姆斯基：再说一遍，经常是当我做了一件我认为合法的事时，国家却认为是非法的，就是说国家是罪人。在某些情况下这并不确切。我是非常实际的，因而从阶级斗争转向帝国主义战争。因为帝国主义战争的情况比较清楚也比较容易。
Take international law, a very weak instrument as we know, but nevertheless one that incorporates some very interesting principles. Well, international law is, in many respects, the instrument of the powerful : it is a creation of states and their representatives. In developing the presently existing body of international law, there was no participation by mass movements of peasants.
让我们看一下国际法。大家都知道这是个非常脆弱的条约，但里面有些值得注意的条款。从许多方面来看，这是一个权贵们的条约，是国家和国家代理人炮制的产物，农民群众组织绝没有参与此条约的制定。
The structure of international law reflects that fact; that is, international law permits much too wide a range of forceful intervention in support of existing power structures that define themselves as states against the interests of masses of people who happen to be organised in opposition to states.
国际法的结构反映这样一个事实：它为现行的权力结构提供了一个过分宽广的干涉领域。现行的权力结构被看作是反对那些因反对国家而组织起来的群众的利益。
Now that's a fundamental defect of international law and I think one is justified in opposing that aspect of international law as having no validity, as having no more validity than the divine right of kings. It's simply an instrument of the powerful to retain their power.
这是国际法的主要不足之处。我觉得它远不如国王们的神圣法规。国际法只不过是希望维持手中权力的权贵们的工具。我们有一切理由来反对它。
But, in fact, international law is not solely of that kind. And in fact there are interesting elements of international law, for example, embedded in the Nuremberg principles and the United Nations Charter, which permit, in fact, I believe, require the citizen to act against his own state in ways which the state will falsely regard as criminal. Nevertheless, he's acting legally, because international law also happens to prohibit the threat or use of force in international affairs, except under some very narrow circumstances, of which, for example, the war in Vietnam is not one. This means that in the particular case of the Vietnam War, which interests me most, the American state is acting in a criminal capacity. And the people have the right to stop criminals from committing murder. Just because the criminal happens to call your action illegal when you try to stop him, it doesn't mean it is illegal.
还有另外一种国际法。在纽伦堡条约和联合国宪章里有一些有意义的条款，我认为这些条款实际上要求公民以国家错误地认为有罪的方式来反对自己的国家。它还是依法行事的，因为国际法禁止在国际事务中使用威胁手段或动用武力。一些特殊的情况例外，但越战不属此范围。在越战这个特殊情况下，美国政府的行为如同一个罪犯，我对此极为关注。那么人们就有权制止罪犯犯重罪。当大家努力捕捉罪犯时，就不应当由罪犯声言此举不合法。这就是事实。
A perfectly clear case of that is the present case of the Pentagon Papers in the United States, which, I suppose, you know about.
一个令人震惊的例子是美国五角大楼的文件案。你们肯定都听说此事了。
Reduced to its essentials and forgetting legalisms, what is happening is that the state is trying to prosecute people for exposing its crimes. That's what it amounts to.
此事的过程就不谈了。简单地说，政府竭力寻找揭露罪行的人。
Now, obviously that's absurd, and one must pay no attention whatsoever to that distortion of any reasonable judicial process. Furthermore, I think that the existing system of law even explains why it is absurd. But if it didn't, we would then have to oppose that system of law.
显然这是荒谬的，似乎人们不应对合理司法程序的扭曲予以重视。此外我认为现行的司法制度说明了这种荒谬，不然的话，我们都要群起反对它。
FOUCAULT: So it is in the name of a purer justice that you criticise the functioning of justice ?
福柯：您以较为纯洁的公正名义批判了司法的运作。
There is an important question for us here. It is true that in all social struggles, there is a question of "justice". To put it more precisely, the fight against class justice, against its injustice, is always part of the social struggle : to dismiss the judges, to change the tribunals, to amnesty the condemned, to open the prisons, has always been part of social transformations as soon as they become slightly violent. At the present time in France the function of justice and the police is the target of many attacks from those whom we call the "gauchistes". But if justice is at stake in a struggle, then it is as an instrument of power; it is not in the hope that finally one day, in this or another society, people will be rewarded according to their merits, or punished according to their faults. Rather than thinking of the social struggle in terms of "justice", one has to emphasise justice in terms of the social struggle.
目前对于大家来说这是一个重要的问题。更准确地说，反对阶级公正、反对不公正的斗争永远是社会斗争的一部分。罢免法官、改组法庭、赦免罪犯、打开监狱，历来是社会变革进行到较为激烈时的部分表现。目前在法国，司法、公安的职权是被「左派」攻击的靶子。但当公正被牵扯进斗争里时，是因为公正是权力的工具，而并非大家希望有一天在这个或那个社会里人们可以论功行赏、论过受罚。用公正字眼思考社会斗争还不如用社会斗争词汇来关注公正。
CHOMSKY: Yeah, but surely you believe that your role in the war is a just role, that you are fighting a just war, to bring in a concept from another domain. And that, I think, is important. If you thought that you were fighting an unjust war, you couldn't follow that line of reasoning.
乔姆斯基：是的。在从其他领域引进概念时，您肯定认为您在斗争中的角色是正面的，您的斗争是正义的，我想这是重要的。如果您觉得是场非正义战争，那您的想法会不一样。
I would like to slightly reformulate what you said. It seems to me that the difference isn't between legality and ideal justice; it's rather between legality and better justice.
我想稍微改动一下您说的话。我觉得分歧并不在合法性与理想的公正之间，而存在于合法性与一个较为公正的司法之间。
I would agree that we are certainly in no position to create a system of ideal justice, just as we are in no position to create an ideal society in our minds. We don't know enough and we're too limited and too biased and all sorts of other things. But we are in a position-and we must act as sensitive and responsible human beings in that position to imagine and move towards the creation of a better society and also a better system of justice. Now this better system will certainly have its defects. But if one compares the better system with the existing system, without being confused into thinking that our better system is the ideal system, we can then argue, I think, as follows :
当然我们绝对不可能创建出一个理想的司法制度，也不可能创建出一个理想的社会。对此我们知之甚少，受限制过多，并带有偏见。但像敏锐的、有责任心的人那样行事，我们就可以想象出一个比较好的社会和司法，甚至把它们创建出来。这个体制肯定会有它的不足之处，但当把它与现行的体制进行对比、不带有已达到理想体制的想法时，我们便会得到以下论点：
The concept of legality and the concept of justice are not identical; they're not entirely distinct either. Insofar as legality incorporates justice in this sense of better justice, referring to a better society, then we should follow and obey the law, and force the state to obey the law and force the great corporations to obey the law, and force the police to obey the law, if we have the power to do so.
合法性这个概念与公正概念既不相同也不是完全不同。当合法性囊括了公正，就比较好的司法进入了比较好的社会来说，我们应该服从法律并强迫国家、大的行会和警察机关服从法律，如果我们有此权力的话。
Of course, in those areas where the legal system happens to represent not better justice, but rather the techniques of oppression that have been codified in a particular autocratic system, well, then a reasonable human being should disregard and oppose them, at least in principle; he may not, for some reason, do it in fact.
自然，在那些司法体制并不公正，而只是压制方法系统化的特殊专制制度下，一个理智的人如果在现实中出于各种理由不能无视和反对这个司法体制，他至少应在原则上加以反对。
FOUCAULT: But I would merely like to reply to your first sentence, in which you said that if you didn't consider the war you make against the police to be just, you wouldn't make it.
福柯：我想简单地回答您刚才说的第一句话。您说如果您不认为同警察进行的斗争是正确的，您就放弃它。
I would like to reply to you in terms of Spinoza and say that the proletariat doesn't wage war against the ruling class because it considers such a war to be just. The proletariat makes war with the ruling class because, for the first time in history, it wants to take power. And because it will overthrow the power of the ruling class it considers such a war to be just.
我用斯宾诺莎的话回答您。无产阶级之所以同领导阶级进行战争，并不是因为这是一场正义战争，而是因为无产阶级要夺取政权，这是历史上的第一次。无产阶级要推翻领导阶级的权力，他们认为这场战争是正义的。
CHOMSKY: Yeah, I don't agree.
乔姆斯基：我不同意。
FOUCAULT: One makes war to win, not because it is just.
福柯：发动战争是为了胜利，并非因为这场战争是正义的。
CHOMSKY: I don't, personally, agree with that.
乔姆斯基：从个人观点出发，我不同意这个说法。
For example, if I could convince myself that attainment of power by the proletariat would lead to a terrorist police state, in which freedom and dignity and decent human relations would be destroyed, then I wouldn't want the proletariat to take power. In fact the only reason for wanting any such thing, I believe, is because one thinks, rightly or wrongly, that some fundamental human values will be achieved by that transfer of power.
比如说，如果我信服了无产阶级参加政权参导致国家走向恐怖警察国家，自由、尊严和适宜的人际关系会消失殆尽，我会竭尽全力去阻止的。我想希望发生此类事情的唯一理由是坚持以为人类的基本价值会通过政权的更迭得以实现。
FOUCAULT: When the proletariat takes power, it may be quite possible that the proletariat will exert towards the classes over which it has just triumphed, a violent, dictatorial and even bloody power. I can't see what objection one could make to this.
福柯：无产阶级取得政权后，它可能会对败于手下的阶级行使暴力、专政，甚至是流血的。我不知道对此会有什么异议。
But if you ask me what would be the case if the proletariat exerted bloody, tyrannical and unjust power towards itself, then I would say that this could only occur if the proletariat hadn't really taken power, but that a class outside the proletariat, a group of people inside the proletariat, a bureaucracy or petit bourgeois elements had taken power.
现在您会说，无产阶级是否也会对自己行使这种血腥的暴君式和不公正的权力呢？那么我的回答是：这只会发生的在无产阶级还未真正掌握权力时针对无产阶级之外的一个阶级或无产阶级内部的一小撮人，或者官僚分子、小资产阶级的遗老遗少们。
CHOMSKY: Well, I'm not at all satisfied with that theory of revolution for a lot of reasons, historical and others. But even if one were to accept it for the sake of argument, still that theory maintains that it is proper for the proletariat to take power and exercise it in a violent and bloody and unjust fashion, because it is claimed, and in my opinion falsely, that that will lead to a more just society, in which the state will wither away, in which the proletariat will be a universal class and so on and so forth. If it weren't for that future justification, the concept of a violent and bloody dictatorship of the proletariat would certainly be unjust. Now this is another issue, but I'm very sceptical about the idea of a violent and bloody dictatorship of the proletariat, especially when expressed by self-appointed representatives of a vanguard party, who, we have enough historical experience to know and might have predicted in advance, will simply be the new rulers over this society.
乔姆斯基：这种关于革命的理论不能使我满意，即使在辩论的范围内必须接受它。原因很多，历史的或非历史的。这个理论认为无产阶级有权在暴力、流血和不公正的情况下夺取及行使权力，理由是这样便可以到达一个比较公正的社会。在这个社会里国家消亡了，无产者组成了共同一致的阶级等等。没有这个对于未来的辩解，暴力和血腥的专政概念会是彻底地不公正的。这是另一类问题。但我对暴力和血腥专政持怀疑态度，尤其当这个专政是由某个先锋党自我选定的代表体现出来时，这些人只会成为这个社会的新领导。对此我们已有足够的历史经验了。
FOUCAULT: Yes, but I haven't been talking about the power of the proletariat, which in itself would be an unjust power; you are right in saying that this would obviously be too easy. I would like to say that the power of the proletariat could, in a certain period, imply violence and a prolonged war against a social class over which its triumph or victory was not yet totally assured.
福柯：对。但我并未谈及无产阶级专政，这个权力本身可能就不公正。您有理由认为这可能太容易了。我想说的是，无产阶级政权在某个时期可能会对它还未完全战胜的社会阶级使用暴力和发动长期战争。
CHOMSKY: Well, look, I'm not saying there is an absolute.. . For example, I am not a committed pacifist. I would not hold that it is under all imaginable circumstances wrong to use violence, even though use of violence is in some sense unjust. I believe that one has to estimate relative justices.
乔姆斯基：好吧，我并未说它是专制的。再说我不是完全的和平主义者。尽管求助暴力从某种意义上说是不公正的，但我也不认为求助暴力在任何情况下都是错误的。我认为应该相对地确定公正与否。
But the use of violence and the creation of some degree of injustice can only be justified on the basis of the claim and the assessment-which always ought to be undertaken very, very seriously and with a good deal of scepticism that this violence is being exercised because a more just result is going to be achieved. If it does not have such a grounding, it is really totally immoral, in my opinion.
只有当保证有助于达到比较公正的结果时才可以极为谨慎地使用暴力及某种程度的相对不公正。无此基础，我认为就是地道的不道德。
FOUCAULT: I don't think that as far as the aim which the proletariat proposes for itself in leading a class struggle is concerned, it would be sufficient to say that it is in itself a greater justice. What the proletariat will achieve by expelling the class which is at present in power and by taking over power itself, is precisely the suppression of the power of class in general.
福柯：关于无产阶级的目标，它是通过阶级斗争确立起来的，我不认为说它从自身来看是比较伟大的公正就足够了。当无产阶级把现在正在掌握权力的阶级清除出去，当它自己掌握了政权的时候，准确地说，无产阶级想做的是废除一般意义上的阶级政权。
CHOMSKY: Okay, but that's the further justification.
乔姆斯基：好，但这个辩解应在其后而来。
FOUCAULT: That is the justification, but one doesn't speak in terms of justice but in terms of power.
福柯：这是政权意义上的辩解，而非公正意义上的。
CHOMSKY: But it is in terms of justice; it's because the end that will be achieved is claimed as a just one.
但这关系到公正，因为要达到的目标被认作是公正。
No Leninist or whatever you like would dare to say "We, the proletariat, have a right to take power, and then throw everyone else into crematoria." If that were the consequence of the proletariat taking power, of course it would not be appropriate.
任何一位列宁主义者都不敢说：「我们，无产阶级，我们有权夺取政权并把所有的人都扔进焚尸炉。」如果这种情况必须发生，最好阻止无产阶级夺取政权。
The idea is-and for the reasons I mentioned I'm sceptical about it-that a period of violent dictatorship, or perhaps violent and bloody dictatorship, is justified because it will mean the submergence and termination of class oppression, a proper end to achieve in human life; it is because of that final qualification that the whole enterprise might be justified. Whether it is or not is another issue.
认为专政时期可能是暴力和血腥时期的想法被认可，是因为这意味着阶级压迫的垮台和结束。我对此话持怀疑态度，理由我已经说过了。对于一个人来说，这个目的是正确的，不管其深层是否有别的东西。正是这种最终评价使全部行动合法化。
FOUCAULT: If you like, I will be a little bit Nietzschean about this; in other words, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it.
福柯：不管怎么说，我有点尼采信徒的味道。换句话说，我觉得公正概念自身就是被发明出来和被使用到各个不同类型社会里的概念，如同某些政权和经济权力的工具，或像用以反对这些权力的武器。但我觉得公正这个概念在阶级社会里运作起来就像被压迫阶级所要求的和压迫者所认定的那样。
CHOMSKY: I don't agree with that.
乔姆斯基：我不同意。
FOUCAULT: And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.
福柯：而在一个无阶级社会里人们是否还使用公正概念，我对此无把握。
CHOMSKY: Well, here I really disagree. I think there is some sort of an absolute basis--if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble, because I can't sketch it out-ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded.
乔姆斯基：对此我完全不能同意您的看法。我认为在人类的基本性质中有一个绝对基础，公正概念便形成于人类基本性质中。如果您坚持您的观点，我将处于困境，因我不能清晰地阐明我的观点。
I think it's too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression; I don't think that they are that. I think that they embody systems of class oppression and elements of other kinds of oppression, but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly, valuable concepts of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy, which I think are real.
我有些仓促地将现行的司法制度归类于阶级压迫的工具，我想此事不那么简单。这些司法制度还表现出了其他形式的压迫，同时它也表现出对真正的公正、名誉、友情、仁慈和同情概念的探讨。我想这也是显而易见的。
And I think that in any future society, which will, of course, never be the perfect society, we'll have such concepts again, which we hope, will come closer to incorporating a defence of fundamental human needs, including such needs as those for solidarity and sympathy and whatever, but will probably still reflect in some manner the inequities and the elements of oppression of the existing society.
任何未来的社会肯定不是十全十美的社会。我想上述这些概念仍会存在并能更好地保卫人类的基本需要，如团结的需要和同情的需要，可能仍会有目前社会中存在的不公正和压迫因素。
However, I think what you're describing only holds for a very different kind of situation.
然而我认为您所说的则不同。
For example, let's take a case of national conflict. Here are two societies, each trying to destroy the other. No question of justice arises. The only question that arises is which side are you on ? Are you going to defend your own society and destroy the other ?
以民族冲突为例，两拨人互相摧毁，这时公正概念没有任何意义。摆在人们面前的唯一问题是：你站在哪一方？你要保卫自己一方面摧毁对方吗？
I mean, in a certain sense, abstracting away from a lot of historical problems, that's what faced the soldiers who were massacring each other in the trenches in the First World War. They were fighting for nothing. They were fighting for the right to destroy each other. And in that kind of circumstance no questions of justice arise.
把某些历史问题撇在一边，从某种意义上看，这就是一战时在战壕里厮杀的战士们所面临的问题。他们白白地厮杀一场，而只是由于有权厮杀而已。在类似的情况下，公正不起任何作用。
And of course there were rational people, most of them in jail, like Karl Liebknecht, for example, who pointed that out and were in jail because they did so, or Bertrand Russell, to take another example on the other side. There were people who understood that there was no point to that mutual massacre in terms of any sort of justice and that they ought to just call it off.
当然，有一些有理性的人指出了这点，因而被投入监狱。比如卡尔·李卜克内西，还有贝特朗·罗素，他们被看作是敌方人员。他们清楚任何形式的公正都不允许这样的杀戮，他们有义务昭示天下。
Now those people were regarded as madmen or lunatics and criminals or whatever, but of course they were the only sane people around.
于是他们被看作是疯子、精神病人、罪人。不容置疑，他们是这个时代唯一的智力健全的人。
And in such a circumstance, the kind that you describe, where there is no question of justice, just the question of who's going to win a struggle to the death, then I think the proper human reaction is : call it off, don't win either way, try to stop it-and of course if you say that, you'll immediately be thrown in jail or killed or something of that sort, the fate of a lot of rational people.
在您所说的情况下，唯一的问题就是知道谁会在这场生死战斗中胜利。我想正常人的反应应是：揭露战争，拒绝所有的胜利，竭尽全力制止战争，冒着被投入监狱甚至杀头的的危险去制止战争，这是许多有理智的人的命运。
But I don't think that's the typical situation in human affairs, and I don't think that's the situation in the case of class-conflict or social revolution. There I think that one can and must give an argument, if you can't give an argument you should extract yourself from the struggle. Give an argument that the social revolution that you're trying to achieve is in the ends of justice, is in the ends of realising fundamental human needs, not merely in the ends of putting some other group into power, because they want it.
在人类事务中，我并不认为这是典型情况，不认为这适合于阶级斗争或社会革命的情况。在后两种情况下，如果不能评判战斗，就必须放弃战斗。人们应表明所进行的社会战斗最终通向公正，是为满足人类的基本需求，而非将权力交给一群人仅仅因为他们想得到它。
FOUCAULT: Well, do I have time to answer ?
福柯：好，我还有时间反驳吗？
ELDERS: Yes.
埃勒德：是的。
FOUCAULT: How much ? Because. . .
福柯：多少时间？因为……
ELDERS: Two minutes. [Foucault laughs.]
埃勒德：两分钟。
FOUCAULT: But I would say that that is unjust. [Everybody laughs.]
福柯：这不公正……
CHOMSKY: Absolutely, yes.
乔姆斯基：是的，绝对不公正。
FOUCAULT: No, but I don't want to answer in so little time. I would simply say this, that finally this problem of human nature, when put simply in theoretical terms, hasn't led to an argument between us; ultimately we understand each other very well on these theoretical problems.
不，我是说我不可能用这么短的时间说清楚，我简单谈一下。人性这个问题在理论方面我并未有分歧，可以说在理论问题上我们是相互沟通的。
On the other hand, when we discussed the problem of human nature and political problems, then differences arose between us. And contrary to what you think, you can't prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realisation of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilisation, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should-and shall in principle--overthrow the very fundaments of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can't find the historical justification. That's the point. ..
从另一方面看，当我们讨论人性问题、政治问题时，我们之间的差异就显露出来了。同您所想的相反，您无法阻挡我认为人性、公正、实现人类本质的这些概念是生成于我们文明内部、在我们的知识类型和我们哲学形式之中的概念，因而是我们阶级体制的一部分。我们不能使这些概念在描写和评判一场战斗中发生作用，这是十分遗憾的。这场战斗可能是，原则上应该是，动摇我们社会的基础。这里有一个我还未能找到历史证明的推论是……
CHOMSKY: It's clear.
乔姆斯基：显而易见。
ELDERS: Mr. Foucault, if you were obliged to describe our actual society in pathological terms, which of its kinds of madness would most impress you ?
埃勒德：福柯先生，如果您必需用病理学词汇来描写我们现在的社会，哪些是给您印象最深刻的疯狂形式？
FOUCAULT: In our contemporary society?
福柯：在我们现代社会里？
ELDERS: Yes.
埃勒德：是的。
FOUCAULT: If I were to say with which malady contemporary society is most afflicted ?
福柯：您是要我说出我们的社会最主要的病症？
ELDERS: Yes.
埃勒德：对。
FOUCAULT: The definition of disease and of the insane, and the classification of the insane has been made in such a way as to exclude from our society a certain number of people. If our society characterised itself as insane, it would exclude itself. It pretends to do so for reasons of internal reform. Nobody is more conservative than those people who tell you that the modern world is afflicted by nervous anxiety or schizophrenia. It is in fact a cunning way of excluding certain people or certain patterns of behaviour.
福柯：人们都是以把一部分人排挤出我们社会方式来给疾病、疯狂下定义的，对疯子进行分类。如果我们的社会被确定为是疯狂的，那么它也会被自我排挤出去，以进行内部改革为由可以做到这一点。说当代社会患了惊恐症或精神分裂症的人比任何人都保守。事实上，排挤出一些人或一些行为的意图是一种诡诈的伎俩。
So I don't think that one can, except as a metaphor or a game, validly say that our society is schizophrenic or paranoid, unless one gives these words a non-psychiatric meaning. But if you were to push me to an extreme, I would say that our society has been afflicted by a disease, a very curious, a very paradoxical disease, for which we haven't yet found a name; and this mental disease has a very curious symptom, which is that the symptom itself brought the mental disease into being. There you have it.
除非使用隐喻或诙谐手法，我不认为我们的社会患了精神病学意义上的精神分裂症或偏执狂。如果您非要逼我，我可能会说我们的社会确实得了一种怪病，非常反常的病，直到目前还未为它找到恰当的名称。这种精神方面的疾病有一种奇怪的症状，它能够引发精神病，就这样。
ELDERS: Great. Well, I think we can immediately start the discussion.
埃勒德：妙极了。那么，我想我们可以接着讨论了。
QUESTION: Mr. Chomsky, I would like to ask you one question. In your discussion you used the term "proletariat"; what do you mean by "proletariat" in a highly developed technological society ? I think this is a Marxist notion, which doesn't represent the exact sociological state of affairs.
一与会者：乔姆斯基先生，我向您提一个问题。在讨论中您使用了「无产者」这个词，在一个科技高度发达的社会里，这意味着什么？我觉得这是马克思的一个概念，它表现不出现实社会学的情况。
CHOMSKY: Yes, I think you are right, and that is one of the reasons why I kept hedging on that issue and saying I'm very sceptical about the whole idea, because I think the notion of a proletariat, if we want to use it, has to be given a new interpretation fitting to our present social conditions. Really, I'd even like to drop the word, since it's so loaded with specific historical connotations, and think instead of the people who do the productive work of the society, manual and intellectual work. I think those people should be in a position to organise the conditions of their work, and to determine the ends of their work and the uses to which it's put; and, because of my concept of human nature, I really think of that as partially including everyone. Because I think that any human being who is not physically or mentally deformed-and here I again must disagree with Monsieur Foucault and express my belief that the concept of mental illness probably does have an absolute character, to some extent at least-is not only capable of, but is insistent upon doing productive, creative work, if given the opportunity to do so.
乔姆斯基：您的意见非常正确，这也是我尽力避开这一主题的原因之一。我说我有许多疑惑，因为我认为我们应给予无产阶级这一概念一个新的、适合我们目前社会条件的解释。我愿意放弃这个词，它已不堪特定历史内涵的重负，而想到那些在体力方面或脑力方面完成社会生产工作的人。他们应可以安排它们的工作条件、决定和实现自己的目标。按照我的人性概念，我认为这部分地包括了所有的人。我认为任何一位体质与精神都未被扭曲的人不仅能够并且也希望在有机会的情况下从事创造性工作。与福柯先生相反，我确信精神病症可能有绝对的特征，至少在某种程度上是这样。
I've never seen a child who didn't want to build something out of blocks, or learn something new, or try the next task. And the only reason why adults aren't like that is, I suppose, that they have been sent to school and other oppressive institutions, which have driven that out of them.
我从未见到一个孩子拒绝用积木搭建什么玩艺儿、学习新鲜东西或完成下一个任务。只有成人不是这样，因为他们已在学校和其他令人压抑的地方度过了一段时光，这种愿望早已消失殆尽。
Now if that's the case, then the proletariat, or whatever you want to call it, can really be universal, that is, it can be all those human beings who are impelled by what I believe to be the fundamental human need to be yourself, which means to be creative, to be exploratory, to be inquisitive. . .
在这种情况下，无产阶级，你们愿意怎么叫就怎么叫吧，可以直正具有普遍性，即代表了所有具备人类基本需求的人。这些需求就是：实现自我，进行创作和发现，表达自己……
QUESTION: May I interrupt ?
与会者：我能打断您吗？
CHOMSKY: . . to do useful things, you know.
乔姆斯基：……做有益事情的愿望。这大家都清楚。
QUESTION: If you use such a category, which has another meaning in Marxist ...
与会者：如果您使用这个范畴，那么在马克思思想里还有另一种意思……
CHOMSKY: That's why I say maybe we ought to drop the concept.
乔姆斯基：……正因为如此，我说过我们可能应放弃这一概念。
QUESTION: Wouldn't you do better to use another term ? In this situation I would like to ask another question : which groups, do you think, will make the revolution?
与会者：难道您不能选用一个别的词吗？在这种情况下，我想再提一个问题：根据您的看法，什么人会闹革命？
CHOMSKY: Yes, that's a different question.
乔姆斯基：这是不同的问题。
QUESTION: It's an irony of history that at this moment young intellectuals, coming from the middle and upper classes, call themselves proletarians and say we must join the proletarians. But I don't see any class-conscious proletarians. And that's the great dilemma.
与会者：目前，一些出身于中产阶级和大资产阶级的年轻知识分子声称自己是无产者，他们号召我们加入无产阶级，这是历史的讽刺。而在真正的无产阶级中似乎并没有阶级意识，真是莫大的窘困。
CHOMSKY: Okay. Now I think you're asking a concrete and specific question, and a very reasonable one.
乔姆斯基：好，我认为您的问题很实际、很特殊并且有它的道理。
It is not true in our given society that all people are doing useful, productive work, or self-satisfying work-obviously that's very far from true - or that, if they were to do the kind of work they're doing under conditions of freedom, it would thereby become productive and satisfying.
在我们的社会里，并不是所有的人都从事着有益的、生产性的工作，或对自己来说有兴趣的工作，现实相差甚远。换句话说，如果他们在自由的条件下从事这些工作，这些工作就会成为生产性的和令人满意的。
Rather there are a very large number of people who are involved in other kinds of work. For example, the people who are involved in the management of exploitation, or the people who are involved in the creation of artificial consumption, or the people who are involved in the creation of mechanisms of destruction and oppression, or the people who are simply not given any place in a stagnating industrial economy. Lots of people are excluded from the possibility of productive labour.
大多数人更确切地说都投入到其他活动中去了，诸如经营开发、制造人为消费或搞破坏、搞压迫；要不然就在停滞不前的工业经济中找不到任何位置。许多人被剥夺了拥有一份生产性工作的可能性。
And I think that the revolution, if you like, should be in the name of all human beings; but it will have to be conducted by certain categories of human beings, and those will be, I think, the human beings who really are involved in the productive work of society. Now what this is will differ, depending upon the society. In our society it includes, I think, intellectual workers; it includes a spectrum of people that runs from manual labourers to skilled workers, to engineers, to scientists, to a very large class of professionals, to many people in the so-called service occupations, which really do constitute the overwhelming mass of the population, at least in the United States, and I suppose probably here too, and will become the mass of the population in the future.
我认为，如果你们同意的话，革命应以全人类的名义进行。但它的领导者应是一些在社会中真正从事生产性工作的一类人。生产性工作的内容随条件变化而不同。在我们的社会里，我想包括了脑力劳动者，包括了从体力劳动者到熟练工人，到工程师，到研究者，到一个宽广的自由职业者阶级和许多第三产业的职员，他们构成了人民群众，至少在美国是这样。在我们这儿也如此，我想。
And so I think that the student-revolutionaries, if you like, have a point, a partial point : that is to say, it's a very important thing in a modern advanced industrial society how the trained intelligentsia identifies itself. It's very important to ask whether they are going to identify themselves as social managers, whether they are going to be technocrats, or servants of either the state or private power, or, alternatively, whether they are going to identify themselves as part of the work force, who happen to be doing intellectual labour.
因此我想革命的大学生们并没有错：知识界同一的方式在现代工业社会里非常重要。必需搞清他们是否像公司经理那样同一，他们是否有意成为专家出身的高级官员、国家公务员或私营部门的职员，或者他们是否要同生产力量同一，用脑力参加生产。
If the latter, then they can and should play a decent role in a progressive social revolution. If the former, then they're part of the class of oppressors.
在后一种情况下，他们可以在进步的社会革命中担当正确的角色。在前种情况下，他们将属于压迫阶级。
QUESTION: Thank you.
与会者：谢谢。
ELDERS: Yes, go on please.
埃勒德：请继续讲下去。
QUESTION: I was struck, Mr. Chomsky, by what you said about the intellectual necessity of creating new models of society. One of the problems we have in doing this with student groups in Utrecht is that we are looking for consistency of values. One of the values you more or less mentioned is the necessity of decentralisation of power. People on the spot should participate in decision-making.
另一与会者：乔姆斯基先生，您关于建立社会新模式的智力需要的说法使我深受震动。我们在同乌德勒支大学学生共同工作中要解决的问题之一便是价值的协调。您刚才提到，价值之一是必要的权力分散。从事实际工作的人应当有决定权。
That's the value of decentralisation and participation : but on the other hand we're living in a society that makes it more and more necessary--or seems to make it more and more necessary-that decisions are made on a world-wide scale. And in order to have, for example, a more equal distribution of welfare, etc., it might be necessary to have more centralisation. These problems should be solved on a higher level. Well, that's one of the inconsistencies we found in creating your models of society, and we should like to hear some of your ideas on it.
这就是地方分权与参与的价值。但从另一方面来说，我们生活在一个越来越需要以世界角度出发作出决定的社会。为了较公正地进行社会援助，应该需要比较大的集中，应该在一个相当高的层次上解决这些问题。这是建立新的社会模式中的不协调点之一。我们想知道您对此问题的看法。
I've one small additional question--or rather a remark to make to you. That is : how can you, with your very courageous attitude towards the war in Vietnam, survive in an institution like MIT, which is known here as one of the great war contractors and intellectual makers of this war?
我还有一个小问题，或者说是一个小意见。我认为您对越南战争的态度非常大胆，但您如何能生活在像麻省理工学院这样的机构里？麻省理工学院在此地被看作是战争制造者之一，是这场冲突的智力决策者。
CHOMSKY: Well, let me answer the second question first, hoping that I don't forget the first one. Oh, no, I'll try the first question first; and then remind me if I forget the second.
乔姆斯基：我先来回答第二个问题，希望别忘记第一个问题。不，我还是先回答第一个问题吧，如果我忘记了另一个问题，请你们提醒我。
In general, I am in favour of decentralisation. I wouldn't want to make it an absolute principle, but the reason I would be in favour of it, even though there certainly is, I think, a wide margin of speculation here, is because I would imagine that in general a system of centralised power will operate very efficiently in the interest of the most powerful elements within it.
总的说来我是支持地方分权的，但我不想把这作为绝对原则。尽管中央集权体制有相当大的思辨余地，我还是认为这种体制的有效运行有利于其内部最强大的组成部分。
Now a system of decentralised power and free association will of course face the problem, the specific problem that you mention, of inequity-one region is richer than the other, etc. But my own guess is that we're safer in trusting to what I hope are the fundamental human emotions of sympathy and the search for justice, which may arise within a system of free association.
当然地方分权和自由组合体制会面临您提到的不平等问题，比如一个地区更富庶等等。我较有把握地信赖我希望的人类基本情感——团结和追求公正，它们可以在自由组合的体制中发扬光大。
I think we're safer in hoping for progress on the basis of those human instincts than on the basis of the institutions of centralised power, which, I believe, will almost inevitably act in the interest of their most powerful components.
我想，企盼建立在人类本性基础上的进步要比企盼建立在中央集权机构上的进步要有把握。这些机构不可避免地按照自己最强大的组成部分的利益行事。
Now that's a little abstract and too general, and I wouldn't want to claim that it's a rule for all occasions, but I think it's a principle that's effective in a lot of occasions.
这要说有些抽象和空泛，我不想说这是放之四海而皆准的规律，但我认为在多数情况下这是一条灵验的原则。
So, for example, I think that a democratic socialist libertarian United States would be more likely to give substantial aid to East Pakistani refugees than a system of centralised power which is basically operating in the interest of multinational corporations. And, you know, I think the same is true in a lot of other cases. But it seems to me that that principle, at least, deserves some thought.
举一个例子。我认为民主的、社会主义的和绝对自由主义的美国在为东巴基斯坦难民提供救援方面要比一个中央集权体制国家更快捷有效，后者主要依照多民族利益行事。大家知道，在许多情况下的确如此。我觉得这是一个值得深思的问题。
As to the idea, which was perhaps lurking in your question anyway-it's an idea that's often expressed-that there is some technical imperative, some property of advanced technological society that requires centralised power and decision-making-and a lot of people say that, from Robert McNamara on down-as far as I can see it's perfect nonsense, I've never seen any argument in favour of it.
您的问题反映出这样一种看法，即技术的发展和先进的科技社会的性质都需要一个中央集权和专制的政权。这是个常被提及的问题，很多人加以认可，首当其冲的是罗伯特·麦克纳马拉。我认为这种想法是十分荒谬的，我从未找到对此观点有利的论据。
It seems to me that modern technology, like the technology of data-processing, or communication and so on, has precisely the opposite implications. It implies that relevant information and relevant understanding can be brought to everyone quickly. It doesn't have to be concentrated in the hands of a small group of managers who control all knowledge, all information and all decision-making. So technology, I think, can be liberating, it has the property of being possibly liberating; it's converted, like everything else, like the system of justice, into an instrument of oppression because of the fact that power is badly distributed. I don't think there is anything in modern technology or modern technological society that leads away from decentralisation of power, quite the contrary.
我觉得现代科技，比如对资料的处理或通讯，的确具有不利的蕴涵。它意味着对信息和理解的追求可以迅速被所有人掌握，无需先集中到少数经理手中，即控制所有知识、所有信息和掌握所有决定权的人手中。同其他一切事物一样，科技也有解放我们的性质，它也会转变，就像司法制度会变成压迫工具一样，主要是因为权利分配不公。我认为在科技里或在现代科技社会里，什么都不会使我们远离地方分权，而恰恰相反。
About the second point, there are two aspects to that : one is the question how MIT tolerates me, and the other question is how I tolerate MIT. [Laughter.]
关于第二个问题，我是从两个方面来看的：麻省理工学院如何能容忍我及我如何能容忍它？
Well, as to how MIT tolerates me, here again, I think, one shouldn't be overly schematic. It's true that MIT is a major institution of war-research. But it's also true that it embodies very important libertarian values, which are, I think, quite deeply embedded in American society, fortunately for the world. They're not deeply embedded enough to save the Vietnamese, but they are deeply embedded enough to prevent far worse disasters.
我想不能过分简单地看这个问题。的确，麻省理工学院在军事研究方面扮演了举足轻重的角色，但它同时也具有基本的绝对自由主义特点。幸好这些特点已牢固地植根于美国社会，虽然还远未到能拯救越南人民的程度，但已可以避免更大的灾祸。
And here, I think, one has to qualify a bit. There is imperial terror and aggression, there is exploitation, there is racism, lots of things like that. But there is also a real concern, coexisting with it, for individual rights of a sort which, for example, are embodied in the Bill of Rights, which is by no means simply an expression of class oppression. It is also an expression of the necessity to defend the individual against state power.
在这里我们应有所保留。帝国主义的侵略和恐怖依然存在，就像种族主义和剥削到处存在一样。它们引起人们对个人权利的真正关注，比如用绝对没有阶级压迫内容的《人权法案》来捍卫个人权利，它同时也表达了保护个人不受国家暴力侵害的需要。
Now these things coexist. It's not that simple, it's not just all bad or all good. And it's the particular balance in which they coexist that makes an institute that produces weapons of war be willing to tolerate, in fact, in many ways even encourage, a person who is involved in civil disobedience against the war.
这一切都是共存的，此事既不简单也非泾渭分明。由于共同生存的事物之间的特殊平衡，一个生产战争武器的机构能够允许甚至鼓励一个人投入到反战的民间反抗中去。
Now as to how I tolerate MIT, that raises another question. There are people who argue, and I have never understood the logic of this, that a radical ought to dissociate himself from oppressive institutions. The logic of that argument is that Karl Marx shouldn't have studied in the British Museum which, if anything, was the symbol of the most vicious imperialism in the world, the place where all the treasures an empire had gathered from the rape of the colonies, were brought together.
至于我怎么能忍受麻省理工学院，这是另一个问题。有些人认为一个左派人士应远离压迫机构。我搞不清这是根据什么逻辑得出此种观点。根据这种观点，卡尔·马克思不应在大英博物馆研究，因为这里至少是世界最残酷的帝国主义的象征，帝国把它从各殖民地掠夺来的宝物收藏于此。
But I think Karl Marx was quite right in studying in the British Museum. He was right in using the resources and in fact the liberal values of the civilisation that he was trying to overcome, against it. And I think the same applies in this case.
我认为卡尔·马克思有充分理由在此研究，利用这里的资料创造文明的自由价值。我的情况亦如此。
QUESTION: But aren't you afraid that your presence at MIT gives them a clean conscience ?
一与会者：您不担心您的加盟会使麻省理工学院感到良心无愧吗？
CHOMSKY: I don't see how, really. I mean, I think my presence at MIT serves marginally to help, I don't know how much, to increase student activism against a lot of the things that MIT as an institution does. At least I hope that's what it does.
乔姆斯基：我看不出会是这样。我加入到麻省理工学院从侧面有助于反对麻省理工学院作为干涉机构的活动。当然我不知道能做到何种程度，至少我是这样希望的。
ELDERS: Is there another question ?
QUESTION: I would like to get back to the question of centralisation. You said that technology does not contradict decentralisation. But the problem is, can technology criticise itself, its influences, and so forth ? Don't you think that it might be necessary to have a central organisation that could criticise the influence of technology on the whole universe ? And I don't see how that could be incorporated in a small technological institution.
一与会者：我想回到中央集权问题上。您刚才说科技并不与地方分权背道而驰，但是科技有能力自我评判它的影响力吗？难道您不认为需要设立一个中央组织在全世界范围内评判科技的影响吗？我不清楚在一个很小的科技机构里如何进行这项工作？
CHOMSKY: Well, I have nothing against the interaction of federated free associations; and in that sense centralisation, interaction, communication, argument, debate, can take place, and so on and so forth, and criticism, if you like. What I am talking about is the centralisation of power.
乔姆斯基：好吧！我一点也不反对自由联邦组合中的相互作用。在这个意义上，中央集权、相互作用、通讯、讨论、辩论都可以找到它们的位置，如果您愿意的话，评判也如此。但我说的是权力的分散。
QUESTION: But of course power is needed, for instance to forbid some technological institutions from doing work that will only benefit the corporation.
与会者：当然，权力是必需的，比如为了禁止科技机构完成一项仅对某一行业有利的工作。
CHOMSKY: Yeah, but what I'm arguing is this : if we have the choice between trusting in centralised power to make the right decision in that matter, or trusting in free associations of libertarian communities to make that decision, I would rather trust the latter. And the reason is that I think that they can serve to maximise decent human instincts, whereas a system of centralised power will tend in a general way to maximise one of the worst of human instincts, namely the instinct of rapaciousness, of destructiveness, of accumulating power to oneself and destroying others. It's a kind of instinct which does arise and functions in certain historical circumstances, and I think we want to create the kind of society where it is likely to be repressed and replaced by other and more healthy instincts.
乔姆斯基：对。我的观点是这样的：在采取正确决策时，如果必需在一个集中的权力或一个绝对自由社团间的自由组合中作选择的话，我情愿选择第二个。因为我想它可以最大限度地发挥人类善良的本性。而一个中央集权体制一般来说却最大限度地发展人类最恶劣的本性——贪得无厌破坏，目的是为自己牟取权力而消灭别人。这种本性是在一定的历史条件下出现和运作的。我想我们希望建立一个没有这种恶性的社会。在这样的社会里，人类恶性被健康本性取而代之。
QUESTION: I hope you are right.
与会者：我希望您有道理。
ELDERS: Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think this must be the end of the debate. Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Foucault, I thank you very much for your far-reaching discussion over the philosophical and theoretical, as well as the political questions of the debate, both for myself and also on behalf of the audience, here and at home.
埃勒德：夫人们，先生们，我想今天的讨论到此结束。乔姆斯基先生，福柯先生，我以个人名义及全体与会者的名义为这次颇有深度的哲学、理论及政治讨论会向你们二人表示诚挚的谢意。